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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the Coast Guard’s maritime security relationship with the 
Cuban Border Guard—before, during, and after normalization—through a qualitative 
case study comparison of five distinct mission areas: drug interdiction, migrant 
interdiction, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and port security. By 
reviewing the aftereffects of the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S.-Cuba policy, 
specifically the impact on the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard security relationship, it 
is possible to recognize that such a policy reversal does not serve the national security 
interests of the United States. The operational focus of the Coast Guard’s maritime 
security cooperation with the Cuban Border Guard, combined with measured growth in 
mission areas of mutual concern, are key factors in the long-term success of this 
important relationship. With no significant concentration of bilateral security exchanges 
since 2018, the United States should take steps to reinvigorate law enforcement 
cooperation with Cuban authorities in areas such as counternarcotics, illegal migration, 
counterterrorism, and mass rescue operations. 
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Despite the ups and downs in the political and diplomatic relationship, bilateral 
cooperation between the United States and Cuba still needs to continue, if only because the 
countries are so close geographically and have many security and other interests in 
common. Enduring relationships, such as those between the Coast Guard and Cuban 
Border Guard, are a testament to what can be accomplished when common ground is 
established through areas of mutual security concern. As the only branch of the armed 
forces with law enforcement statutory authority, the Coast Guard’s unique authorities 
improve international engagement and security cooperation in complex political 
environments. This distinctive instrument of U.S. soft power is not widely understood nor 
well documented, and the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border 
Guard is no exception. 
This research examines the Coast Guard’s maritime security relationship with the 
Cuban Border Guard—before, during, and after normalization—through a qualitative case 
study comparison of five distinct mission areas: drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, 
search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and port security. The Coast Guard’s 
early, incremental successes with the Cuban Border Guard represent important 
foundational building blocks, positioning this well-established security relationship for 
considerable growth and expanded cooperation during the Obama administration’s thaw in 
U.S.-Cuba relations. Furthermore, implications of the Coast Guard’s relationship with the 
Cuban Border Guard as a model for use with other countries, especially those with political 
differences that otherwise limit constructive dialogue and cooperation, is also considered. 
Finally, by reviewing the aftereffects of the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S.-Cuba 
policy, specifically the impacts on the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard security 
relationship, it can be recognized that such a policy reversal does not serve the national 
security interests of the United States. 
The operational focus of the Coast Guard’s maritime security cooperation with the 
Cuban Border Guard, combined with measured growth in mission areas of mutual concern, 
are key factors in the long-term success of this important relationship. The Coast Guard’s 
xvi 
investment in the permanent in-person liaison position at U.S. Embassy Havana is another 
key factor that signals commitment to a cooperative relationship built on trust and mutual 
respect. Expanded cooperation between Coast Guard and Cuban authorities across multiple 
mission areas during normalization is also noteworthy. In fact, the Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard relationship served as a catalyst for broader bilateral law enforcement 
cooperation. The United States and Cuba negotiated and signed multiple security 
arrangements, developed new frameworks for the exchange of information, and expanded 
security dialogues across the law enforcement spectrum. 
With no significant concentration of bilateral security exchanges since early 2018, 
the United States should take steps to reinvigorate important dialogues on counter-
narcotics, illegal migration, counterterrorism, and mass rescue operations, among others. 
Instead of using the still unexplained health incidents as an excuse to marginalize U.S.-
Cuba relations, the United States should collaborate with Cuba’s scientific and medical 
experts in the continued search for an explanation. The following recommendations 
encourage a return to increased law enforcement cooperation with Cuban authorities and 
best serve the national security interests of the United States: 
(1) Renew counterdrug cooperation and information sharing. This renewal 
would likely lead to increased drug disruptions and interdictions, as well as deter further 
expansion of drug trafficking networks. 
(2) Restore Embassy Havana diplomatic staffing, reestablish consular services, 
and return to commitments outlined in the migration accords. Although illegal migration 
from Cuba to the United States has continued to trend down substantially since the 2017 
repeal of wet foot/dry foot, increased sanctions combined with the challenges of currency 
reunification, COVID-19, and the lack of accessible consular services have pressurized the 
possibility of another wave of illegal migration. 
(3) Rekindle the periodic reciprocal exchange series between the Coast Guard 
and Cuban Border Guard. Search and rescue is a mainstay in this longstanding security 
relationship, but the last semi-annual technical exchange took place in January 2018. The 
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maritime safety and security implications associated with these areas of mutual concern 
are too significant to ignore. 
(4) Now that the United States and Cuba have established a shared framework 
for oil spill response and contingency planning, continued cooperation in this relatively 
new but critical area of mutual security concern should be encouraged. 
(5) Finally, regardless of whether maritime travel and trade builds back to 
normalization era levels under President Biden, port security cooperation must continue to 
play an important role moving forward. 
Despite Trump’s traditional hardline approach regarding Cuba, none of the 22 
signed bilateral agreements stemming from normalization were vacated. The Biden 
administration should take this opportunity to renew bilateral security cooperation in areas 
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The Obama administration’s historic shift in U.S.-Cuba policy led to significant 
bilateral engagement and remarkable gains across numerous sectors during the first phase 
of normalization. Removing Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, 
reestablishing diplomatic relations, and increasing travel, trade, and the exchange of 
information represented three major steps in the policy shift away from economic sanctions 
and other efforts to isolate Cuba.1 Renewed medical and scientific research, the restoration 
of commercial air and cruise passenger travel, substantial growth in Cuba’s entrepreneurial 
small business sector, and the repeal of the 1995 wet-foot/dry-foot illegal migration policy, 
represent other recent advances. 
With so many positive developments during normalization, people would tend to 
think the bilateral security relationship would remain strong and multi-faceted with 
numerous mature relationships involving various U.S. government agencies and their 
Cuban counterparts. To the contrary, the significant expansion of cooperation across the 
security sector during normalization cooled dramatically during the Trump administration, 
which was accelerated primarily by the dramatic reduction in Embassy staff following the 
still unexplained health incidents that affected U.S. diplomats serving in Havana.2 The last 
significant concentration of bilateral security exchanges took place in the first few months 
of 2018 and included dialogues on counter-narcotics, illegal migration, cybersecurity, 
preventing terrorism, oil spill response, and mass rescue operations.3 Similarly, consular 
 
1 Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, CRS in Focus No. IF10045 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2017), 1, ProQuest. 
2 Geoff Thale and Marguerite Rose Jimenez, Why the U.S. Should Deepen Security Cooperation with 
Cuba (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2018), https://www.wola.org/analysis/us-
deepen-security-cooperation-cuba/. 
3 Sarah Marsh, “Cuba, U.S. Hold Talks on Law Enforcement despite Tensions,” Reuters, January 19, 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-idUSKBN1F902J; Paul Guzzo, “Marine Science 
Collaboration Endures despite Political Chill between U.S., Cuba,” Tampa Bay Times, March 7, 2018, 
https://tampabay.com/news/environment/Marine-science-collaboration-endures-despite-political-chill-
between-U-S-Cuba_166093980/; “Cuba and the United States Strengthen Cooperation in the Field of 




services all but shuttered as immigrant visa case processing moved to the U.S. Embassy in 
Georgetown, Guyana, and the coveted five-year multiple entry tourist visa was reduced to 
a single entry valid for three months, and only obtainable off island at other U.S. 
consulates.4 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite the ups and downs in the political and diplomatic relationship, bilateral 
cooperation between the United States and Cuba still needs to continue, if only because the 
countries are so close geographically and have many security and other interests in 
common. Although the bilateral security relationship has quieted considerably, all 22 
bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding remain in place.5 Enduring 
relationships involving aviation security (Transportation Security Administration (TSA)), 
maritime security (Coast Guard), and monthly military-to-military fence line talks in 
Guantanamo continue, albeit at a much slower pace. 
Perhaps Randy Beardsworth correctly asserts, “the most well-established 
functional relationship between the two governments exists between the U.S. Coast Guard 
(Coast Guard) and Cuban Border Guard [Tropas Guardafronteras].”6 As the only branch 
of the military with law enforcement statutory authority, the Coast Guard’s unique 
authorities improve international engagement and security cooperation in complex political 
environments, specifically in the maritime domain. Surprisingly, this distinctive instrument 
of U.S. soft power is not widely understood nor well documented, and the Coast Guard’s 
longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border Guard is no exception. 
 
4 Mario Penton, “Visas for Cubans Have a New Limit. The Change Affects U.S. Family and Shopping 
Trips,” Miami Herald, March 18, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/cuba/article228075974.html. 
5 Marc Frank, “United States and Cuba Complete Deals as Trump Era Set to Begin,” Reuters, January 
18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-deals-idUSKBN1522C7. 
6 Randy Beardsworth, “U.S.-Cuba Functional Relationships: A Security Imperative,” in 9 Ways for 
U.S. to Talk to Cuba and Cuba to Talk to U.S., ed. Sara Stephens and Alice Dunscomb (Washington, DC: 
Center for Democracy in the Americas, 2009), 93–98. 
3 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
By comparing Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard cooperation before, during, and 
after normalization through the lens of five statutory missions: search and rescue (SAR), 
drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, marine environmental protection, and port security, 
what lessons can be learned about security cooperation with Cuba and its relevance to U.S. 
national security? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An extensive review of existing literature by scholars, leaders, and experts was 
conducted to determine the extent of documentation about the Coast Guard’s role in 
establishing and strengthening U.S. security relationships with Cuba, and more broadly, 
written works advocating for security cooperation with Cuba. Beginning with scholarly 
works, such as those by Lars Schoultz and Hal Klepak, which trace the evolution of security 
cooperation in the Caribbean, and more specifically with Cuba, a narrative was constructed 
illuminating how U.S. perspectives on cooperation with Cuba have changed.7 Of particular 
interest were three distinct periods: following the Cold War thaw and collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s, after the 1994–95 Cuban mass migration crisis (the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to improve U.S.-Cuba relations), and leading up to the historic 
2014 rapprochement.  
Drilling down further, scholarly articles on defense and security cooperation 
abounded before normalization but are scarce during this momentous period of increased 
engagement. Conventional wisdom focuses primarily on defense engagement—also 
referred to as military-to-military—and highlights normalization goals and objectives 
touted as ways to engage the Cuban military or Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR). 
Conversely, some experts direct their attention to the security aspects of collaboration by 
examining the Ministry of Interior (MININT) and its pervasive state security role, 
 
7 Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas, eds., Security, Democracy, and Development in 
U.S.-Latin American Relations (Miami, FL: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1994); Hal Klepak, 
“Cuban-U.S. Cooperation in the Defense and Security Fields: Where Are We? Where Might We Be Able 
to Go?,” in Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations: How Should We Now Play Ball?, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez, 
Rafael M. Hernández, and Lorena G. Barberia, revised and updated (New York: Routledge, 2017), 82–100. 
4 
including the Cuban Border Guard component, a law enforcement cooperation that 
predominates. Regardless of how U.S. military and law enforcement experts interpreted 
the abundance of engagement opportunities during normalization, the Cuban government 
consistently represented its interests with delegations of Cuban security officials. 
Meanwhile, MINFAR components remained beyond the reach of U.S. engagement, 
seemingly reserved for another phase of normalization and trust building, the only 
exception being the legacy Guantanamo fence line talks. Although limited in number, 
writings focused on the security aspects of engagement routinely highlight the importance 
of the Coast Guard’s role in bilateral security cooperation. 
Margaret Crahan and Soraya Castro Mariño have assembled an essential collection 
of reports advocating for continued dialogue and cooperation in Cuba-U.S. Relations: 
Normalization and Its Challenges.8 This work stems from a partnership between Columbia 
University’s Institute for Latin American Studies (ILAS) and Cuba’s Center for 
International Policy Studies, Institute of International Relations (ISRI). In particular, two 
of the reports advocate for expanded security dialogue and point to the Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard relationship as one to emulate.9 
A third category of literature details diplomatic and political aspects of the bilateral 
relationship, including often agreed views on pressing defense and security matters voiced 
during numerous diplomatic exchanges, an important aspect of this retrospective narrative 
study. William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh provide an exhaustive history of back 
channel dialogue and negotiations between the United States and Cuba in their recent work, 
which advocates for diplomacy and dialogue, as well as rapprochement, and the eventual 
 
8 Margaret E. Crahan and Soraya M. Castro Marino, eds., Cuba-U.S. Relations: Normalization and Its 
Challenges (New York: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2016). 
9 Geoff Thale, “U.S.-Cuba Security Cooperation after D17: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Cuba-
Us Relations: Normalization and Its Challenges, ed. Margaret E. Crahan and Soraya M. Castro Marino 
(New York: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2016), 225–39; Soraya M. Castro Marino, “The New Era 
of Cuba-U.S. Relations: Breaking Down Axioms and Establishing Lasting Legacies,” in Cuba-US 
Relations: Normalization and Its Challenges, ed. Margaret E. Crahan and Soraya M. Castro Marino 
(Washington, DC: Institute of Latin American Studies, Columbia University, 2016), 49–82. 
5 
elimination of economic sanctions.10 Melanie Ziegler’s scholarly analysis of various 
“confidence-building measures (CBMs)” designed to foster cooperation, particularly 
against drug trafficking and illegal migration, also affords clues about the Coast Guard’s 
efforts to cultivate its relationship with the Cuban Border Guard.11 Although these works 
provide limited references to the Coast Guard’s role in security cooperation with Cuba, 
they highlight the value of established diplomatic channels and the regular exchange of 
information. 
For decades, scholars and politicians have argued for and against the normalization 
of relations with Cuba. Recent memoirs by Ben Rhodes and Susan Rice, key principals of 
Obama’s national security team, set the stage for normalization and offer chapter-sized 
glimpses into the chain of decisions and events leading up to the December 17, 2014 
announcements.12 They also stress the significance of Obama’s historic visit to Havana. 
From a national security policy standpoint, they clearly consider the shift in U.S.-Cuba 
policy game changing and worth continuing. To find opposing academic views, it is 
necessary to reference literary works from the early 2000s, such as those written by Cuban-
American conservative Jaime Suchlicki, former director of the Institute of Cuban and 
Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami.13 Thus, most recent literature supports 
normalization. 
Other categories of literature included in this body of research are Congressional 
hearings on Cuba policy, Congressional Research Service reports, and original source 
documents, such as the Department of State’s (DOS) annual International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Reports (INCSRs). For instance, the February 26, 2015 hearing before 
 
10 William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of 
Negotiations between Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2015). 
11 Melanie M. Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation Past, Present, and Future, Contemporary Cuba 
(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007), 37–87. 
12 Benjamin Rhodes, The World as It Is: Inside the Obama White House (New York: Random House, 
2018); Susan Rice, Tough Love: My Story of the Things Worth Fighting for (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2019). 
13 Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro and Beyond, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac 
Books, Inc., 2002). 
6 
the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, regarding the Obama administration’s new Cuba policy, provides context in 
the form of dissenting opinions from conservative organizations and hardliners opposed to 
the opening.14 The annual INCSRs trace the history of U.S.-Cuba counter-narcotics 
cooperation and help to dispel the hardline rhetoric, which sometimes surfaces, without 
evidence, to accuse the Cuban government of involvement in the illegal drug trade.15 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research for this thesis developed a case study comparison of Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard cooperation before, during, and after normalization to document and analyze 
lessons learned about security cooperation with Cuba and its impact on U.S. national 
security. Recognizing the limited scholarship about this unique security relationship, 
coupled with the author’s personal experiences as the Coast Guard liaison in Havana 
throughout the normalization period, the subject of this case study, as described by Thomas, 
is a combination of an outlier case and a local knowledge case.16 In other words, it is an 
outlier because it is an exceptional or special case, and the author’s intimate knowledge of 
the relationship’s inner workings provides a more detailed understanding of the case.17 
This thesis begins by reviewing the changing perspectives of security cooperation with 
Cuba, specifically after the Cold War thaw and collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, following the 1994–95 Cuban mass migration crisis, and leading up to the historic 
opening during Obama’s second term. Although limited in number, scholarly works, such 
as Castro Mariño’s (mentioned previously in the literature review), were incorporated to 
provide the Cuban point of view. This chronological narrative, or diachronistic review as 
 
14 The President’s New Cuba Policy and U.S. National Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee of 
the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 1st 
sess., February 26, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg93534/pdf/CHRG-
114hhrg93534.pdf. 
15 The Department of State’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR) are 
available at: https://www.state.gov/international-narcotics-control-strategy-reports/. 
16 Gary Thomas, How to Do Your Case Study, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2016), 98–110. The 
author served as Coast Guard liaison at U.S. Embassy Havana from June 2014 to July 2018. 
17 Thomas, 98–110. 
7 
described by Bruner, helps to explain the origins of the Coast Guard’s relationship with the 
Cuban Border Guard.18 
This review is followed by a detailed examination of the Coast Guard’s relationship 
with Cuban authorities conducted through the lens of five statutory missions: drug 
interdiction, migrant interdiction, SAR, marine environmental protection, and port 
security. Each mission’s historical context is considered, policy milestones and operational 
successes are highlighted, as well as limitations, and examples provided of expanded 
opportunities cultivated in each mission area. 
Finally, critical observations obtained through interviews with a select group of 
experts, which represent firsthand diplomatic, law enforcement, policy, and academic 
perspectives about security cooperation with Cuba, and specifically, the Coast Guard-
Cuban Border Guard relationship, are included as part of the research design. Since the 
literature review confirmed the limited number of firsthand accounts of this unique but 
important bilateral security relationship, the author identified several experts as interview 
participants. The author selected these experts because of their deep knowledge of, or 
intimate involvement with, U.S. efforts to expand security cooperation with Cuba.19 
E. ARGUMENT 
This thesis examines the positive and productive security relationship between the 
Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard through the lens of five mission-specific case 
studies, particularly since the 1994–95 mass migration crisis. The Coast Guard’s early, 
incremental successes with the Cuban Border Guard in three areas of mutual security 
concern—drug trafficking, illegal migration, and SAR—represent important foundational 
building blocks in a longstanding but not well-known maritime security relationship. 
Despite complicated ups and downs at the political level of the U.S.-Cuba relationship, 
maritime security cooperation between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard has 
 
18 Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (October 1991): 
6, https://doi.org/10.1086/448619. 
19 This research plan was submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board and 
approved on August 28, 2020, under protocol NPS.2020.0051-IR-EP7-A. 
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continued unabated. Not surprisingly, this resilient relationship was well-positioned to 
expand during normalization as SAR coordination strengthened and the additional building 
blocks of marine environmental protection and port security developed. 
Anchored by the recognized need for in-person collaboration, this shared 
commitment to a cooperative and respectful relationship, combined with the significant 
expansion of mission-related initiatives during the normalization process, highlighted the 
importance of cooperation and trust building in areas of mutual security concern. 
Furthermore, by reviewing the aftereffects of the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S.-
Cuba policy, specifically the impacts on the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard security 
relationship, it is possible to recognize that such a policy reversal does not serve the 
national security interests of the United States. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, the first of which explains the primary 
research question and the significance of the Coast Guard’s longstanding maritime security 
relationship with the Cuban Border Guard. Chapter II incorporates a brief contextual 
overview of the evolving regional security dynamics in the Caribbean after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, which highlights the recognition of the illegal drug trade as the principal 
destabilizing threat to the region. Chapter II also acknowledges the promising but limited 
period of U.S.-Cuba security policy changes following the 1994–95 Cuban mass migration 
crisis and the gradual thaw leading up to the historic rapprochement during Obama’s 
second term. 
Using a case study approach, Chapters III and IV examine Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard security cooperation through the mission areas or foundational building 
blocks of drug interdiction and migrant interdiction, respectively. Although the legacy SAR 
relationship is also considered a foundational building block, collaboration in this mission 
area was limited in scope until the normalization process encouraged expanded, more 
robust cooperation. Consequently, SAR collaboration is examined along with the Coast 
Guard’s marine environmental protection (specifically, oil spill response) and port security 
missions in Chapters V–VII. Indeed, the early successes shared between these neighboring 
9 
maritime security services were incremental and developed gradually over time, but as 
confidence increased, and the political thaw unfolded, other building blocks of cooperation 
became possible between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard. 
Chapter VIII concludes the thesis by emphasizing the findings from the case study 
examinations of the five mission areas and suggesting areas for future research. 
Implications of the Coast Guard’s relationship with the Cuban Border Guard as a model 
for use with other countries (by the Coast Guard or other law enforcement agencies), 
especially those with political differences that otherwise limit constructive dialogue and 
cooperation, is also considered. 
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II. SECURITY COOPERATION AND NORMALIZATION 
This chapter incorporates a brief contextual overview of the evolving regional 
security dynamics in the Caribbean after the collapse of the Soviet Union and highlights 
the recognition of the illegal drug trade as the perceived principal threat to stability. The 
chapter then points out the Coast Guard’s quiet but significant placement of a resident 
liaison in Havana as part of U.S. efforts to bridge the security divide with Cuba. The chapter 
next acknowledges the promising but limited U.S.-Cuba security policy changes following 
the 1994–95 Cuban mass migration crisis (the Clinton administration’s efforts to 
recalibrate the bilateral relationship) and the gradual thaw leading up to the historic 
rapprochement during Obama’s second term. Recognizing the broad scope of security 
cooperation, the chapter goes on to define its use in the framework of this research. Finally, 
the chapter touches on the geopolitical challenges with Cuba and the significance of the 
Obama administration’s dramatic U.S.-Cuba policy shift, especially the implications for 
U.S. foreign policy objectives with the wider Caribbean and Latin America. 
A. NEW THREATS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
As relations warmed between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986 
marked a shift from the Soviet Union to drug trafficking as the perceived primary security 
threat facing the United States. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War prompted Congress to ramp up legislative efforts against Cuba (Cuban 
Democracy Act of 1992 and Cuban Democracy and Solidarity Act of 1996), the growing 
drug threat opened a window to security cooperation between the United States and Cuba.20 
Given its roles and responsibilities combating drug trafficking and illegal migration, the 
U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) was at the forefront of this new paradigm. 
According to Klepak, one of the most evident signs of this gradual change in 
strategic thinking was the placement of a Coast Guard liaison officer (referred to as the 
Drug Interdiction Specialist until 2014) at the U.S. Interest Section in Havana (for drug 
 
20 Klepak, “Cuban-U.S. Cooperation in the Defense and Security Fields,” 84–85. 
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and migrant interdiction coordination).21 Although predominantly related to security issue 
under the purview of MININT and the Cuban Border Guard, access grew incrementally 
over the years as security cooperation improved between the Coast Guard and Cuban 
Border Guard. As Klepak emphasizes, “[The liaison officer] was given a degree of access 
to [the Cuban Border Guard] and other …security operations and installations of the Cuban 
state that is often the envy of other countries’ defense attachés in the country, even those 
closely linked to Cuba by ideological or other ties.”22 
The secret to the long-term success of the Coast Guard liaison position, and Coast 
Guard-Cuban Border Guard cooperation in general, stems from the operational focus of 
the relationship. This critical observation was identified in the author’s interviews with 
select law enforcement and policy experts regarding their perspectives on security 
cooperation with Cuba. On October 28, 2020, the author interviewed Randy Beardsworth 
(retired Coast Guard captain who was a key member of the May 1999 exchange in Havana) 
about the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border Guard. As 
Beardsworth explained, “It’s so important to the Cubans to have this trusted relationship. 
…[and] that high level of trust developed because [the Coast Guard was] only concerned 
with the operational aspects of the relationship.” On January 12, 2021, the author 
interviewed Alan Bersin, Assistant Secretary Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
International Affairs and Chief Diplomatic Officer (2012–2017). Similarly, Bersin 
described the operational nature of the relationship this way: 
The Coast Guard in a very interesting way, one which was carried out 
professionally and discreetly, had very close relationships operationally 
with Cuban authorities. So it came as no surprise to me that the Coast Guard, 
having been the icebreaker…in terms of creating a practical operating 
relationship... would almost naturally and logically… [be] at the forefront 
[during normalization]. 
The Clinton Administration took a more pragmatic approach to U.S.-Cuba policy 
and made inroads with counter-narcotics cooperation, relaxed travel restrictions for Cuban-
Americans to return to the island, and created a people-to-people carve out for academic 
 
21 Klepak, 87. 
22 Klepak, 87. 
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and cultural exchanges between the Cuban and American communities. As Suchlicki 
described, this U.S. inclination to begin a process of normalization was underpinned by 
policy changes contingent upon certain conditions changing in Cuba, an approach that 
Fidel Castro always considered insulting. That said, Castro seemed to be more willing to 
cooperate now that Cuba could no longer rely on the benefits of its relationship with the 
former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, this gradual thaw in U.S.-Cuba relations dampened 
considerably with the February 1996 shoot down of two Brothers to the Rescue (Hermanos 
al Rescate) planes by Cuban military aircraft off Cuba’s north coast. With mounting 
pressure from the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Clinton reacted by 
signing the Cuban Democracy and Solidarity Act of 1996 (also referred to as the Helms-
Burton Act) into law that introduced a range of new sanctions against Cuba and eliminated 
executive privilege over future decisions on lifting the embargo.23 
Thinking it would somehow lead to regime change, the George W. Bush 
administration reverted to the Reagan era hardline approach on Cuba. As Beardsworth 
emphasized during his interview with the author, “It nearly eliminated the Coast Guard 
liaison position in the process.” Thankfully, the Bush administration’s characterization of 
the Caribbean as America’s third border in the fight against illegal drugs contradicted this 
notion, which served as justification to prevent the position’s demise. As expressed in a 
Department of State press release, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the 
Dominican Republic praised the Third Border Initiative and U.S. efforts to close security 
gaps against increasing drug related criminal activity. The multi-faceted program targeted 
enhanced cooperation across the spectrum: diplomatic, security, health, economic, 
environmental, and education.24 Advocates of increased security cooperation with Cuba 
argued that established communications with Cuba’s military were essential to U.S. and 
regional security should Cuba collapse into chaos. In 2006, General Craddock, the outgoing 
Commander, U.S. Southern Command, went on the record recommending a “stem-to-
 
23 Suchlicki, Cuba, 201–4. 
24 Bureau of Public Affairs, “Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic on the Third Border Initiative,” Department of State 
Archive, January 13, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28136.htm. 
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stern” review of U.S.-Cuba policy. His comments were uncharacteristic in that he was still 
actively serving, whereas others saved such comments until after retirement.25 For 
instance, General Wilhelm, who preceded Craddock, probably said it best when he referred 
to Cuba as a “47,000-square-mile blind spot in [our] rearview mirror.”26 
Despite the widespread consensus to cooperate at the interagency level on matters 
of mutual concern, such as counter-narcotics, it took the 2015 reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations and the creation of a bilateral law enforcement working group to 
hearten broader security cooperation.27 Castro Mariño compares the different levels of 
U.S.-Cuba normalization to a multi-layered highway interchange where the highest layer 
represents key leader engagements, such as Obama’s March 2016 visit to Havana or other 
exchanges involving Obama’s cabinet and Castro’s equivalent ministers (e.g., then Deputy 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, met with Cuba’s Minister of the 
Interior, Major General Carlos Fernández Gondín, in October 2015, and agreed to expand 
bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual security concern).28 One layer down in this 
highway interchange analogy is dialogues involving senior political and diplomatic 
officials, where negotiations are required to resolve complicated issues.29 The Bilateral 
Commission, for example, consisting of senior officials from DOS and Cuba’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, was established to steer and prioritize a multitude of initiatives across 
multiple sectors.30 
At the lowest level of this highway interchange analogy, we find exchanges based 
on existing agreements or areas of mutual concern, such as the law enforcement and 
 
25 Pablo Bachelet, “SOUTHCOM General: Cuba Policy Needs a Fresh Look,” Miami Herald, May 26, 
2006, Final edition. 
26 Bachelet. 
27 Klepak, “Cuban-U.S. Cooperation in the Defense and Security Fields,” 89–90. 
28 Castro Marino, “The New Era of Cuba-U.S. Relations,” 53–54; “Cuba, U.S. Agree on Need to 
Cooperate on Security,” Agence France-Presse, October 29, 2015, https://infoweb-newsbank-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/resources/doc/nb/news/158C89ACC428D990?p=AWNB. 
29 Castro Marino, “The New Era of Cuba-U.S. Relations,” 53–54. 
30 Castro Marino, 53–54; Roberta Jacobson to the Secretary, “U.S.-Cuba Bilateral Talks, January 22, 




security sector, where dialogues expanded to include port security, human smuggling, 
secure trade and travel, legal cooperation, and counter-terrorism.31 The Coast Guard and 
Cuban Border Guard, which met sporadically from 1999 through 2013 (only in Cuba), 
were now meeting semi-annually to discuss operational topics ranging from counterdrug 
and illegal migration to mass rescue operations and small vessel security (the Coast Guard 
first hosted Cuban Border Guard officials in early January 2015 in Key West, Florida).32 
As Castro Mariño emphasizes, the signing of the bilateral Counternarcotics Arrangement 
on July 22, 2016, was the best example of law enforcement and security sector 
cooperation.33 
B. DEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION 
Security cooperation includes a broad spectrum of activities with foreign defense 
and security forces that promote U.S. national security interests and foreign policy 
objectives, while developing partner nation capabilities and supporting contingency 
operations for U.S. military forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) is the established 
lead agency for activities or operations involving foreign military or defense components. 
However, complicated or limited security relationships, such as the U.S. military’s 
interactions with Cuba’s armed forces, are organized by DOS through the interagency 
developed Integrated Country Strategy (ICS).34 Although defense cooperation is limited to 
monthly fence line talks at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, security cooperation 
involving other U.S. agencies and organizations occurs regularly in areas of shared security 
concern, such as law enforcement, counterterrorism, environmental protection, and SAR. 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to note the utility of the Coast Guard as a 
military branch operating under DHS, which provides DOD and DOS with unique 
 
31 Castro Marino, “The New Era of Cuba-U.S. Relations,” 54–56. 
32 The author served as Coast Guard liaison at U.S. Embassy Havana from June 2014 to July 2018. 
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authorities and capabilities to support security cooperation. With 11 statutory missions 
supporting various aspects of maritime safety, maritime security, and marine 
environmental protection, the Coast Guard is oftentimes a “door opener” for national 
security and foreign policy objectives.35 
C. GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION 
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War, it can 
be argued that the last remnant faded with the Obama administration’s push for the 
normalization of relations with Cuba. Obama’s dramatic thaw in U.S.-Cuba policy was 
certainly about changing the playbook within the limits of the trade embargo, but it was 
also an effort to improve wider U.S. cooperation with the Caribbean region and Latin 
America. As LeoGrande explained, “Obama’s opening to Cuba was undertaken in part 
because of the deterioration in U.S. relations with Latin America caused by the old policy, 
and his December 17, 2014, announcement received universal and enthusiastic 
endorsement throughout the hemisphere.”36 Tulchin and Espach made similar assertions 
20 years ago when they advocated for the reintegration of Cuba into Caribbean regional 
affairs, 
If the United States continues to soften gradually its approach toward the 
Castro regime, Cuba’s democratic Caribbean neighbors, its European trade 
partners, and Canada will expect the Cuban government likewise to loosen 
its domestic controls and political freedoms. …change in Cuba – whether 
the economy becomes a thriving economic competitor to the industries of 
other Caribbean nations, or the country lapses into political chaos – carries 
potential threats to the security of the region. …In the long term future, a 
thriving, stable Cuba cooperatively active in regional initiatives and 
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institutions could significantly increase the leverage of the region in its 
extraregional affairs.37 
Ambassador Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Chargé d’Affaires Embassy Havana, 2014–2017, 
and a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s normalization efforts, also emphasized 
Cuba’s importance in the regional context. During an interview with the author on 
December 30, 2020, he described it this way, 
There was a consensus within the administration that the policy toward 
Cuba had failed to achieve its objectives, and Cuba was changing. The 
policy that needed to be put in place was one that could more effectively 
impact that change. Added to this was the fact that neighbors in the Western 
Hemisphere, even among our closest allies, were telling us that this was a 
situation that had to be fixed, that it was interfering in our agenda for the 
region, and it was disrupting the common agenda we were trying to build 
with other countries in the region. 
Finally, as Susan Rice, Obama’s national security advisor, lamented in her recent 
memoir, the U.S. decades-old Cuba policy had done nothing to change the political or 
economic equation on the island. Instead, “the U.S. was reviled by much of Latin America 
as a Goliath trying in vain to squeeze the life out of a Davidian Cuba. Our dated Cuba 
policy was a ball and chain dragging down our broader efforts to strengthen U.S. ties to 
Latin America and the Caribbean and to bolster the wave of democratic progress that had 
washed over large swaths of the region.”38 
D. CONCLUSION 
Two lessons stand out from this broad-brush overview of the changing nature of 
security in the Caribbean and Latin America, not only from a regional perspective, but 
more importantly, in terms of how Cuba fits into the puzzle. The significance of the Coast 
Guard’s maritime security relationship with the Cuban Border Guard will become clear in 
the chapter case studies that follow, but it is important to begin with the understanding that 
the secret to the relationship’s longevity lies in the operational focus and measured growth 
 
37 Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, “Looking Ahead: Regional Relations in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” in Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin 
and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 208–9.  
38 Rice, Tough Love, 407–8. 
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in mission areas of mutual security concern. Additionally, the increasing awareness can be 
seen amongst U.S. policymakers and security professionals of Cuba’s importance to a more 
integrated, multilateral regional security framework. 
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III. SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH 
DRUG INTERDICTION 
The previous chapter provided background and context regarding the evolving 
regional security dynamics in the Caribbean after the collapse of the Soviet Union, focusing 
in particular on the ebb and flow of the U.S.-Cuba relationship during the Clinton and 
Obama presidencies. The operational nature of the Coast Guard’s security relationship with 
the Cuban Border Guard was also identified as the key factor to its long-term success. 
This chapter presents the first of five mission-area case studies and examines U.S.-
Cuba maritime security cooperation through the lens of drug interdiction. It begins with a 
brief summary of the devastating opioid epidemic currently threatening U.S. national 
security, and in stark contrast, compares Cuba’s surprising success at keeping illegal drugs 
from becoming a significant consumption or transshipment problem. Next, the chapter 
traces Cuba’s transformation from alleged Medellín drug cartel transshipment connections 
to cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug trafficking. It then considers 
a number of counterdrug policy milestones, including the July 2016 signing of the U.S.-
Cuba counternarcotics arrangement, and summarizes several drug interdictions that 
underscore the benefits of bilateral law enforcement cooperation in this important area of 
mutual security interest. The chapter acknowledges some of the obstacles to counterdrug 
cooperation caused by the Trump administration’s Cuba policy shift and concludes with a 
recommendation for renewed cooperation and information sharing against this shared 
security challenge. 
A. CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, drug
trafficking was identified as one of the principal threats to U.S. national security. Although 
overshadowed by the war on terror in the last two decades, drug trafficking has continued 
to threaten U.S. security, and regained priority focus in the last few years because of the 
devastating opioid epidemic facing the United States. Of the 750,000 Americans who died 
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from drug overdoses from 1999 to 2018, opioids contributed to an estimated 46,000 drug 
overdose deaths in 2018 alone.39 
Despite the opioid focus, the use of cocaine and amphetamine type stimulants is 
also causing major problems. Cocaine trafficking from Colombia north to Central America 
and the United States continues to present significant challenges to law enforcement and 
security forces across the region. Of the reported 1,311 metric tons (MT) of cocaine seized 
globally in 2018, 85 percent was seized in the Americas (1,114 MT). Although the bulk of 
trafficking routes have shifted from the Caribbean to the Eastern Pacific over the last 10–
15 years, an estimated 90 percent of Colombian-produced cocaine is destined for the 
United States. From 2014–2018, cocaine seizures in the North America sub-region tripled 
from 91 MT to 272 MT. Several contributing factors should be considered when examining 
the exponential increase in cocaine seizures from 2008 to 2018 (71 percent increase), 
including the expansion in manufacturing and trafficking, largely attributed to the 
suspension of aerial eradication efforts in Colombia. The increased quantity of seizures is 
also attributed to greater cooperation with international law enforcement partners.40 
With such widespread consequences, it is unusual that Cuba does not contend with 
the same significant consumption and transshipment problems associated with the illegal 
drug trade. Even though Cuba is situated squarely between Colombia (the number one 
cocaine producing country) and the United States (the number one consumer of cocaine), 
Cuba does not have a significant drug problem. As indicated in the Department of State’s 
annual report of global narcotics control, “Cuba is not a major consumer, producer, or 
transit point of illicit drugs.”41 
39 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “New Data Show Significant Changes in Drug 
Overdose Deaths,” CDC Newsroom, March 19, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0318-
data-show-changes-overdose-deaths.html. 
40 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drug Supply: World Drug Report 2020, vol. 3 (Vienna, 
Austria: United Nations, 2020), 26–29, https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/en/drug-supply.html. 
41 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report, 2019 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2019), 146, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/INCSR-Vol-INCSR-Vol.-I-1.pdf. 
21 
To put it in perspective, Cuban authorities seize an average of two MT of illegal 
drugs annually (combined air and maritime), the majority of which is maritime seizures of 
marijuana found washed up along Cuba’s southeastern coast (from disrupted marijuana 
smuggling runs between Jamaica and the Bahamas). Cuban authorities seized 2.72 MT of 
illegal drugs in the maritime domain (2.5 MT marijuana and 225 kilograms (kg) cocaine) 
and another 30 kg at international airport checkpoints in 2016 (an average yearly total for 
illegal drug seizures in Cuba).42 2017 saw the highest seizure totals in recent years, with 
Cuban authorities recovering 244 bales or 4.57 MT of illegal drugs that washed up along 
their shores (97 percent of which was marijuana) that was jettisoned from an estimated 
63 go-fast vessels.43 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Cuba is certainly a bright spot today in terms of a successful campaign against the 
illegal drug trade, but its reputation on this front was not always positive. In the 1980s and 
1990s, unsubstantiated allegations periodically surfaced attempting to connect the Castro 
brothers to the Medellín drug cartel. 
In what would become a defining moment in Fidel Castro’s personal war on drugs, 
Army Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a revered and decorated war hero who 
led the Cuban military brigades to victory in Angola, was tried along with three high-
ranking state security officials before a 1989 special tribunal. All four were convicted and 
executed by firing squad for conspiring to smuggle large quantities of cocaine through 
Cuba to the United States.44 In addition, the upper echelon leadership of the Ministry of 
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Interior was purged due to related corruption charges between 1989 and 1992, including 
General Jose Abrantes Fernandez (Minister of the Interior), who was sentenced to 20 years 
in prison for his alleged involvement.45 In April 1991, following news reports about U.S. 
allegations of his involvement in drug trafficking, Raul Castro sat down with Mario 
Vazquez Rana, the director of El Sol de Mexico. During the groundbreaking three-part 
interview, he emphatically denounced accusations that Cuba’s leaders were involved in 
drug trafficking, describing Cuba as “uno de los paises mas antidroga del mundo (one of 
the most anti-drug countries in the world).”46 
As the war on drugs intensified into the 1990s, Cuba continued to be viewed with 
scrutiny because of its inability to thwart recurring airdrops to awaiting fast boats that used 
Cuba’s northeast territorial waters as cover from U.S. law enforcement authorities. 
Although most of these transshipments made their way north to the Bahamas and the 
United States, unrecovered cocaine bales would sometimes wash up on Cuba’s shores, 
presenting a challenge to Cuban security forces charged with policing a cash-strapped 
society.47 Furthermore, unfounded allegations continued to surface in the press, including 
the sensational December 1998 news story about the seizure of seven tons of cocaine 
hidden in containers in the port of Cartagéna, Colombia. Although the shipment’s final 
destination was Spain, the vessel’s next port of call was Havana, leading some to conclude 
that Cuba had to be involved in the transshipment.48 
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With Clinton making overtures for increased contact with Cuba in January 1999, 
Castro reinforced his campaign to improve Cuba’s international image. After all, how 
could the United States wage a war against drugs and engage in bilateral negotiations with 
a country alleged to be involved in the transshipment of illegal drugs. Castro further 
underscored how serious Cuba was about the matter, inviting Colombia’s President Andres 
Pastrana to Havana for the signing of Cuba’s 24th bilateral counterdrug agreement.49 While 
Cuban-American hardliners doubled down with amplified pro-embargo rhetoric and 
messaging about the alleged drug connection, the U.S. drug czar, Barry McCaffrey, stated 
that Cuba was cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug trafficking and 
had no tolerance for the international drug trade.50 
Less than one month later, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Coast 
Guard officials traveled to Havana for a first ever counterdrug dialogue with their Cuban 
counterparts. Despite no formal agreement by year’s end, both parties acknowledged the 
need for a structured, more cooperative counterdrug relationship.51 Based on the 
Beardsworth interview, in addition to upgrading the legacy fax communications channel 
to telephone, both parties agreed to establish a resident Coast Guard liaison position in 
Havana (initially referred to as Drug Interdiction Specialist), develop operational radio 
communications protocols, and cooperate case-by-case on counterdrug-related matters. 
The tide had certainly turned as Clinton chose not to add Cuba to the State Department’s 
annual “majors” list of drug producing or transshipment countries.52 Castro had finally 
succeeded in changing the counterdrug narrative in Cuba’s favor. 
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C. POLICY MILESTONES AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES 
One of the earliest and still largest examples of U.S.-Cuba counterdrug cooperation 
involved Cuba’s October 1996 seizure of eight tons of cocaine hidden aboard the coastal 
freighter LIMERICK, a Honduran-flagged vessel attempting to smuggle drugs from 
Colombia into the United States. During the initial Coast Guard boarding (in international 
waters off the northeast coast of Cuba), LIMERICK drifted into Cuban territorial waters, 
which prompted a Coast Guard notification to the Cuban Border Guard and ultimately a 
dockside search of the vessel in Santiago de Cuba by Cuban authorities. DEA and Justice 
Department officials were permitted to gather evidence, and the United States credited 
Cuba with finding the cocaine haul after its extensive search. This unprecedented 
cooperation between U.S. and Cuban law enforcement authorities concluded with 
testimony from four Cuban officials at the Florida trial of the vessel master and chief 
engineer; both Colombian defendants were successfully prosecuted and sentenced to 30 
years in prison for drug smuggling.53 
With the prevalence of a growing drug smuggling problem around Cuba, Castro’s 
government also took steps to increase penalties for drug-related crimes. In February 1999, 
Cuba’s counterdrug laws got an overhaul (Articles 190–193 of Law No. 62, Cuba’s penal 
code). All previous drug-related penalties were doubled; those caught with drugs that 
washed ashore who failed to report them faced four to 10 years in prison. Growing or 
distributing marijuana also carried a sentence of four to 10 years and the confiscation of all 
property involved (often including the family home). Condoning one of these crimes 
resulted in four to 10 years. Crimes involving larger quantities of drugs, such as those 
associated with transshipment operations in Cuba, meant eight to 20 years in prison. Simple 
possession of marijuana, which prior to 1999 was legal but frowned upon, now carried a 
penalty of six months to two years in prison. Finally, if Ochoa’s 1989 execution failed to 
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remove all doubt, government officials found to be involved in the distribution of drugs 
would now face 30 years or death.54 
Cuba’s zero tolerance policy is omnipresent throughout government institutions. 
Cuba’s equivalent to the DEA, the Ministry of the Interior’s National Anti-Drug 
Department (DNA—Dirección Nacional Antidroga), serves as the principal law 
enforcement authority combating the illegal drug trade. The Cuban Border Guard is the 
lead authority in the maritime domain (also a component of the Ministry of the Interior), 
and Customs (AGR—Aduana General de la República) serves as the lead agency at all 
international airports. In addition, an investigative component of the National Police 
supports transnational criminal investigations. Cuba’s Armed Forces serves as a key 
operational force multiplier at the national level, while community level citizen watch 
committees (Comite de Defensa Revolucionaria) monitor their respective neighborhoods 
and a sharp lookout along Cuba’s 3,570 miles of coastline. The National Drug Commission 
serves as the interagency coordinating mechanism for the Ministries of Justice, Interior, 
Foreign Relations, and Public Health.55 
Besides increasing penalties for drug-related crimes in 1999, Cuba also unveiled 
Operación Aché (Operation Hatchet), an interagency standing operational counterdrug 
campaign focused primarily on preventing coastal incursions by drug smuggling vessels. 
It continues in earnest to this day and is now in its third iteration, Operación Aché III.56 
One of the more recent examples of this longstanding, comprehensive counterdrug 
campaign approach spanned 2015 and 2016. 
In July 2015, Cuban law enforcement authorities conducted a successful 
counterdrug surge operation in the vicinity of Niquero and Cabo Cruz along the southeast 
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coast. Local community reporting suggested Jamaican marijuana traffickers were 
attempting to establish a stash location and hub of operations with the support of complicit 
Cuban nationals, the goal being to increase the volume of marijuana smuggled into the 
Bahamas; 295 kg marijuana and $31,000 for the finance of future smuggling operations 
was seized by Cuban authorities. In May 2016, the Granma provincial criminal tribunal 
convicted 11 Cuban nationals for their involvement in this scheme to distribute illegal 
drugs; sentences ranged from 15 to 30 years in prison and included Cuba’s successful 
extradition from Jamaica of the Cuban national considered the principal organizer of this 
drug trafficking operation.57 
Real-time tactical information sharing between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border 
Guard has resulted in multiple interdictions, including the August 2015 arrest of three 
Bahamian nationals attempting to smuggle marijuana from Jamaica to the Bahamas. Acting 
on a tip relayed through the Coast Guard liaison, Cuban authorities located the three 
suspected smugglers and their beached go-fast boat along Cuba’s easternmost coast 
between Baracoa and Punta de Maisi. Ultimately, the suspected smugglers were extradited 
to the Bahamas and tried in Bahamian courts for drug trafficking.58 
Normalization included a focus on bilateral security initiatives, including numerous 
key leader engagements and a series of technical exchanges nested under an umbrella Law 
Enforcement Dialogue. Perhaps the most significant visit for the Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard relationship occurred when Admiral Paul Zukunft, the Commandant of the 
Coast Guard, traveled to Havana from August 13–15, 2015, for meetings with Cuban 
Border Guard counterparts and to represent DHS at the U.S. Embassy flag raising 
ceremony. The bilateral engagement was conducted on the margins of the flag raising 
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ceremony. Admiral Zukunft and his Cuban counterpart, Brigadier General Lazaro Román 
Rodriguez, discussed various maritime security challenges and opportunities for increased 
cooperation between organizations.59 
During an interview with the author on January 11, 2021, Admiral Zukunft shared 
his impressions about this historic first visit of a general officer to Havana since the 
revolution: 
What really struck me first was being invited into the Ministry of Interior 
headquarters. Then, to find out that there had not been a four star general or 
flag officer in that building since Batista. It was more than just lip service 
by our hosts. They really wanted to move this relationship forward in a fast 
way… [They had] high expectations that something very tangible would 
come out of not just a flag raising ceremony, but this relationship [with the 
Coast Guard]. 
Having met with maritime security leaders from all over the globe while serving as 
Commandant, Admiral Zukunft also remarked that he, “was surprised at how forthcoming 
his hosts were in sharing information… [They] really came across as sincere to me.” 
The series of law enforcement technical exchanges met once or twice a year and 
included cooperation on topics, such as counternarcotics, counter-terrorism, human 
smuggling, money laundering, and cybercrime. Despite numerous attempts and various 
proposals from both sides, a formal bilateral counterdrug arrangement between the United 
States and Cuba remained elusive until 2016. As Castro Mariño emphasized, the 
longstanding relationship between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard, particularly 
the trust and cooperation cultivated following the Clinton administration’s placement of 
the resident Coast Guard liaison in September 2000, laid the groundwork to ensure the 
counternarcotics technical exchange was productive from the start.60 The second exchange 
was hosted at DEA Headquarters in early December 2015 and marked the first time a U.S.-
Cuba counterdrug specific dialogue convened in the United States. Over the next several 
months, both governments negotiated and finalized the text of the U.S.-Cuba Operational 
Cooperation Arrangement to Counter Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic 
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Substances, which was signed in Havana on July 21, 2016 during the third counternarcotics 
technical exchange. The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Coast Guard, 
DEA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and DOS.61 
D. HOLD WHAT YOU’VE GOT 
Despite the Trump administration’s efforts to rollback U.S.-Cuba normalization, 
the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard continued to cooperate operationally in the fight 
against drug trafficking. Another first in the bilateral security relationship occurred on July 
7, 2018, when Coast Guard officials transferred a representative drug sample and case 
package to Cuban authorities (the transfer took place in conjunction with an unrelated 
migrant repatriation). The evidence, collected from 611 pounds of jettisoned marijuana 
recovered by Coast Guard cutter VIGILANT and Port Security Unit 309 in early June near 
the Guantanamo Bay naval station entrance, enabled Cuban authorities to prosecute two 
Jamaican nationals detained that same afternoon by the Cuban Border Guard. The close 
coordination between the Coast Guard Seventh District and Cuban Border Guard command 
centers enabled the near simultaneous interdiction and apprehension of the smugglers and 
their go-fast vessel in Cuban waters.62 
The well-established success of the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship 
helped pave the way for better coordination between the drug enforcement authorities of 
both countries. In conjunction with the July 2016 signing of the bilateral counterdrug 
arrangement, the DEA established direct communication channels with Cuba’s DNA. The 
exchange of information on numerous drug investigations, coupled with law enforcement 
cooperation and the subsequent arrests of U.S. fugitives by Cuban authorities, was certainly 
encouraging.63 The 4th and last counternarcotics technical exchange was hosted by DEA 
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in Washington, DC on January 19, 2018. A range of topics was discussed, including money 
laundering, use of the internet to sell and distribute, and the opioid epidemic in the United 
States. Both delegations provided an overview of their drug prevention programs.64 
E. CONCLUSION 
The periodicity of law enforcement cooperation slowed during the second half of 
Trump’s presidency, but there is renewed optimism as the U.S. transitions to President 
Biden. Law enforcement and counterdrug cooperation have long been areas of mutual 
interest for the United States and Cuba, and despite Trump’s traditional hardline approach, 
none of the 22 signed bilateral agreements were vacated. Renewed cooperation and 
information sharing between the United States and Cuba will likely lead to increased drug 
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IV. SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH 
MIGRANT INTERDICTION 
The previous chapter looked at the opioid epidemic currently impacting U.S. 
national security and compared Cuba’s successful efforts to keep drug consumption and 
transshipment from gaining footholds on the island. It also summarized the history of 
counterdrug cooperation between the United States and Cuba, as well as the important 
building block the drug interdiction mission has been to U.S.-Cuba law enforcement 
cooperation, particularly between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard. 
This chapter examines illegal migration and the migrant interdiction mission, 
another foundational building block in the U.S.-Cuba maritime security relationship, 
particularly after the most recent mass migration when more than 30,000 Cubans took to 
the sea in the summer of 1994. It begins with an overview of the wet foot/dry foot policy 
and the unintended consequences of normalization as Cubans speculated about its possible 
elimination. The chapter then provides historical and political context for how Cuban 
migration has evolved since the beginning of the revolution in 1959. It next highlights the 
cooperative efforts of the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard to counter this complex 
maritime security challenge, as well as the dramatic impact of the Obama administration’s 
2017 repeal of wet foot/dry foot. The chapter concludes with some policy considerations 
for the Biden administration, including an example of how enhanced investigative 
cooperation between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities may disrupt human smuggling 
operations that continue to threaten safe and orderly migration. 
A. UNINTENDED PULL FACTOR 
The Obama administration’s 2015 reestablishment of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Cuba spurred a comprehensive review of the bilateral relationship, 
including the reexamination of U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba. The politics 
surrounding Cuban immigration have evolved considerably since the beginning of the 
revolution in 1959. What began as migrants fleeing political persecution changed 
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considerably with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the majority of Cuban migrants left 
the island in search of economic opportunities. 
Although normalization encouraged positive changes like expanded 
entrepreneurial opportunities in Cuba’s nascent private sector, it also contributed to 
unintended consequences, such as increased illegal migration as Cubans speculated about 
the possible elimination of the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) and the wet foot/dry foot 
policy. This uncertainty about how much longer Cubans would enjoy special immigration 
status fueled a significant increase in illegal migration to the United States from 2014 
through the end of calendar year 2016.65 Fiscal year 2014 concluded with almost 25,000 
Cuban migrants making dangerous land and sea crossings trying to reach the United States, 
a two-fold increase over fiscal year 2012 numbers.66 Maritime interdictions of Cuban 
migrants by the Coast Guard increased exponentially from 2,059 in fiscal year 2014 to 
5,228 in fiscal year 2016, a 60 percent increase in the Florida Straits (Table 1).67 
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Table 1. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Interdictions of Cuban Migrants.68 
 
 
During the first 30 years of the revolution, Cubans who emigrated to the United 
States distanced themselves from their relatives back home. “[T]he hundreds of thousands 
who [immigrated] during the first two decades… adamantly opposed ties with their fellow 
Cubans who had stayed behind and sided with the revolution.”69 This deeply divided 
mindset between the Cuban exile community in the United States and those who stayed 
behind changed almost overnight with the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this period 
of severe economic hardship, commonly referred to as the Special Period, Cuba’s economy 
declined by more than 30 percent. In response to the island’s economic crisis, the Cuban 
government relaxed its policies by encouraging Cuban American remittances and return 
visits. Increasing numbers of ordinary Cubans began to reach out to their families abroad 
in search of dollars (remittances quickly became their main source of income).70 
Current U.S. policy governing Cuban migration has its origins in the CAA. The last 
Cuban mass migration of 1994 resulted in the signing of the 1994 and 1995 U.S.-Cuba 
migration accords, and included a provision widely referred to as the wet foot/dry foot 
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policy that reversed U.S. migration practices for Cuban migrants interdicted at sea. Indeed, 
the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, led to a 
thorough reexamination of U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba, and resulted in the 
historic January 2017 repeal of wet foot/dry foot. Suddenly, the impetus or pull factor 
encouraging countless unsafe irregular departures disappeared. No longer would landing 
on U.S. soil guarantee the customary special status to which illegal migrants had become 
so accustomed. 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
This section provides historical and political context for how Cuban migration has 
evolved since the beginning of the revolution in 1959. Initially, Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy categorized all Cuban immigrants arriving in the United States as political 
refugees. Cubans were subject to a “newly invented category exempt from the normal 
rules” and assisted through the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.71 Later that 
same year, Kennedy suspended regular commercial flights from Cuba to the United States. 
The resulting internal immigration pressure ultimately led to Fidel Castro opening the port 
of Camarioca in September 1965 and inviting Cuban exiles to come by boat and pick up 
their relatives. This opening quickly turned into the first Cuban mass migration crisis as 
thousands of fleeing Cuban refugees overwhelmed the U.S. immigration system. President 
Johnson “sought an accommodation” with Cuba by reversing Kennedy’s decision to 
suspend regular air service; a predetermined number of Cubans would be able to immigrate 
each year to the United States by air (these so-called “freedom flights” operated until 
1973).72 
As Sandels and Valdes point out in their historical summary of U.S. immigration 
policy toward Cuba: 
Before 1966, [Cubans] were admitted on a temporary humanitarian basis 
because it was assumed in Washington, DC that the revolutionaries would 
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soon be overthrown obviating the need for a permanent solution. There was 
no special legislation to regularize Cubans illegally arriving under the ad 
hoc systems then in place. Congress attempted to rectify that with passage 
of the Cuban Adjustment Act on November 2, 1966. The legislation was 
supposed to bring order to the process.73 
The CAA granted Cubans an excepted status compared to immigrants from other 
countries. Immigration officials admitted new arrivals as long as they could articulate fear 
of persecution if repatriated to Cuba. After a one-year parole period, Cuban immigrants 
would be eligible to adjust their status to that of a permanent resident. The actual policy 
reads as follows: 
That, notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of 
Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United 
States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the 
United States for at least two years (today only one year), may be adjusted 
by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he 
may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.74 
Unfortunately, the policy “encouraged” illegal immigration and the system quickly 
became overwhelmed, which resulted in “wholesale admission, the issuance of work 
permits, financial assistance and other benefits”75 
In late March and early April 1980, thousands of Cubans sought political asylum at 
the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The situation rapidly deteriorated, and the Peruvian 
government, with support from Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the United States, sought 
assistance from the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (IOM) to 
develop a resettlement plan. Attempting to deflect the negative international spotlight, 
Castro opened the port of Mariel to anyone wishing to depart Cuba. Further, Castro seized 
on President Carter’s pledge “to provide an open heart and open arms” to Cuban migrants, 
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fueling the second and largest mass migration of more than 125,000 Cubans over the next 
six months.76 
The third and most recent mass migration from Cuba occurred in the summer of 
1994, when more than 30,000 took to the sea. Tensions mounted in late July following a 
number of vessel hijackings as Cubans attempted to flee the island’s devastating Special 
Period. Anti-government protests in early August along Havana’s seaside drive, better 
known as the Malecón, prompted Castro to weaponize mass migration once more by 
proclaiming that state security would not prevent Cubans from departing on homemade 
rafts. U.S. immigration facilities quickly exceeded capacity in South Florida, which forced 
Clinton to reverse U.S. migration policy that until then had extended an open door to all 
Cubans attempting to enter the United States. On August 19, 1994, he announced that all 
Cubans interdicted at sea would be taken to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba. 
With approximately 15,000 Haitian migrants already housed in a separate Guantanamo 
migrant camp, the Clinton administration quietly worked behind the scenes to broker an 
agreement with Castro’s Cuba.77 
The first round of bilateral migration talks culminated in the September 1994 
migration accord, in which the United States and Cuba agreed to “facilitate safe, legal, and 
orderly Cuban migration to the United States.” The agreement also stipulated the United 
States would grant a minimum of 20,000 immigrant visas to Cubans each year, a provision 
of the 1984 migratory agreement the United States had failed to uphold. In the May 1995 
migration accord, the United States agreed to parole the more than 30,000 Cubans 
occupying the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo to the United States. The resulting 1994 and 
1995 migration accords marked the first time the two governments successfully cooperated 
to produce a security agreement with the mutual interest of controlling illegal migration.78 
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Henceforth, the Coast Guard would repatriate Cubans interdicted at sea to Cuba, 
unless they could establish a credible fear of persecution. To receive permanent residency 
status under the CAA, they would now have to reach U.S. shores physically. With this 
change, Cuban migrants no longer welcomed the sight of a Coast Guard cutter on the 
horizon; what used to mean an escort to the United States now signaled a probable return 
to Cuba.79 As noted in Sullivan’s research, “[The] so-called ‘wet foot/dry foot’ policy has 
been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the 
United States.”80 A decade into the wet foot/dry foot policy (2005), Ted Henken 
summarized it this way: 
On the U.S. side, the [U.S. Interest Section] in Havana has repeatedly sought 
to discourage potential Cuban rafters from departing, yet the same 
government rewards those who make it across successfully by allowing 
them to stay. The U.S. also seeks to prosecute migrant smugglers for the 
crime of transporting illegal immigrants to the U.S., yet allows those who 
pay them to obtain parole and eventual legal residency if they reach land. 
Finally, the U.S. government places an increasingly harsh economic 
embargo on Cuba, yet ignores the fact that the embargo itself contributes to 
conditions whereby more people will seek to emigrate by any means 
available, contradicting our efforts to achieve a safe, legal, and orderly 
migration policy.81 
As information sharing about illegal departures improved between the Cuban 
Border Guard and Coast Guard, it became increasingly difficult for rafters and small 
fishing boats to run the law enforcement gauntlet across the Florida Straits. Coupled with 
wet foot/dry foot policy dynamics, tactics changed in the late 1990s as Cuban migrants 
started betting on Cuban American smugglers in go-fast boats. Smugglers commanded 
$8,000–$10,000 per person, a price that even Cuban American family members could 
hardly afford. Smugglers would often leave migrants to swim for shore from shallow 
waters along the Florida Keys. With stakes now hinging on Cubans reaching dry land, the 
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Coast Guard and U.S. Customs faced many unpredictable situations, including the highly 
publicized “Surfside Six” landfall north of Miami Beach on June 29, 2006. As news 
helicopters hovered overhead and crowds gathered on the beach, Coast Guard personnel 
used water cannons and pepper spray in an attempt to stop the six Cuban migrants from 
swimming to shore. Hundreds of Cuban American protestors blocked traffic on MacArthur 
Causeway adjacent to the Miami Beach Coast Guard base. Less than 24 hours later, all six 
were released from custody to awaiting revelers along Calle Ocho.82 
Cuban migrant smuggling involving go-fast vessels reached its peak in 2007 as a 
combination of new law enforcement tactics and legal adjustments turned the tables on 
human smuggling networks in South Florida. In August 2016, for example, a 45-count 
indictment was unsealed in South Florida federal courts, accusing five men of organizing 
human smuggling ventures from Cuba to the United States. The Coast Guard stopped at 
least three go-fasts connected to this smuggling organization between November 2005 and 
April 2006, including the final attempt when two of the smugglers refused to stop until 
disabling shots were fired (35 Cuban migrants were found hiding in the forward cabin).83 
C. POLICY MILESTONES AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES 
The trust shared today between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard 
developed incrementally over decades. As Noble describes, the resident Coast Guard 
liaison position, established in September 2000 to increase counterdrug cooperation and 
combat illegal migration, was also borne out of necessity for closer coordination following 
the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue shoot down.  
Despite numerous warnings from the Cuban government through various channels 
(formal and informal), the Clinton administration failed to recognize the seriousness of 
Fidel Castro’s admonitions. On February 24, 1996, Castro had finally had enough of the 
unauthorized entries into Cuban airspace and ordered Cuban military jets to shoot down 
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the Brothers to the Rescue planes. Two of the three planes did not return to South Florida, 
and four Cuban Americans lost their lives that fateful afternoon. Founded in 1991 by Cuban 
exile José Basulto, Brothers to the Rescue assisted the Coast Guard in the search for 
thousands of rafters crossing the Florida Straits. After the 1994 mass migration crisis 
subsided, Basulto’s humanitarian mission evolved, becoming increasingly provocative as 
his small planes repeatedly violated Cuban airspace, on occasion even dropping anti-Castro 
propaganda over Havana proper.84 
The controversial incident fueled at sea protests and memorial services by Cuban 
Americans. Worried about incursions into Cuban territorial waters and another 
international incident, the Coast Guard sent a Seventh District (Miami) staff officer to 
Havana on periodic “circuit rides” to help foster better communication with the Cuban 
Border Guard (and to assess the potential for a permanently staffed resident position).85 
In the 1994 migration accord, Cuba agreed to prevent unsafe departures while the 
United States agreed to interdict rafters at sea and transfer them to the temporarily 
established migrant camps. The 1995 accord established the direct repatriation mechanism 
still used today for Cuban migrants interdicted at sea. Semi-annual migration talks 
combined with Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard operational coordination and technical 
exchanges have deepened the shared understanding of the challenges and complexities 
inherent to countering illegal migration along the U.S.-Cuba maritime border. A key factor 
contributing to the Coast Guard’s success intercepting illegal migrants over the last 25 
years has been Cuban Border Guard notifications. Despite this positive information sharing 
aspect, it is sometimes misconstrued that Cuban authorities are not willing to stop illegal 
departures. As Noble emphasized, “Cuban [officials are] not going to put their people in 
‘harm’s way [in order to take the undocumented migrants] off their rafts, or shoot at 
[smuggling] go-fast boats.”86 Notifying the Coast Guard and enabling the migrant 
interdiction five hours to a few days later, when they are tired and less likely to be 
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aggressive, is a preferable alternative to the potential risk associated with forcing them to 
stop.87 For every illegal departure reported by the Cuban Border Guard, shore patrols and 
local citizenry reporting thwart two to three times as many.88 
The surge in Cuban migrants arriving along the United States southwest border 
from 2014 through 2016 is attributed, in part, to the Cuban government changing its “long-
standing policy of requiring an exit permit… for Cubans to travel abroad.”89 Prior to the 
January 2013 change, it was rare for Cubans to receive permission to travel off the island. 
As emphasized in the beginning of this chapter, the Obama administration’s thaw in U.S. 
relations with Cuba was another contributing factor to the increase in Cuban migration, as 
many Cubans believed the CAA would soon go away. In response, Washington was 
aggressive with strategic messaging in an effort to squelch such rumors, stating repeatedly 
the Obama administration had no plans to change U.S. immigration policy with regard to 
Cubans.90 Unfortunately, this messaging did little to assuage illegal migration, as Cubans 
grew increasingly desperate. The Coast Guard faced a wide range of very difficult maritime 
interdiction scenarios (wet foot), including self-inflicted gunshot wounds, as some 
migrants opted to shoot themselves in the lower left abdomen in extreme hopes of being 
airlifted by helicopter to medical facilities in South Florida (dry foot).91 
Although the Obama administration’s public messaging suggested no changes were 
afoot, high-level negotiations were taking place between U.S. and Cuban officials in 
conjunction with other 2016 bilateral dialogues. For instance, Ambassador Kristie Kenney, 
Counselor of the State Department, headed the U.S. delegation during the third Bilateral 
 
87 Noble, 221. 
88 The author served as Coast Guard liaison at U.S. Embassy Havana from June 2014 to July 2018. 
89 Sullivan, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress, 9. 
90 Mimi Whitefield, “Havana: U.S. Immigration Policy for Cubans Needs to Change,” Miami Herald, 
January 21, 2015, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/cuba/article7866573.html. 
91 “7 Cuban Migrants with Gunshot Wounds Interdicted at Sea,” Associated Press, March 27, 2016, 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/15BE104BC439C598?p=AWNB. 
41 
Commission held in Havana on May 16, 2016.92 Then Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, who was also part of this U.S. delegation, attended the 
Bilateral Commission and met separately with his Cuban security counterparts ahead of 
the second Law Enforcement Dialogue on May 17, 2016. Deputy Secretary Mayorkas’s 
visit came on the heels of the historic signing of a memorandum of understanding between 
the Department of Homeland Security, Cuba’s Ministry of Interior, and Cuba’s Customs 
Authority, a security cooperation arrangement first discussed during Mayorkas’s October 
2015 visit to Havana.93 On the margins of these May 2016 bilateral exchanges, 
Ambassador Kenney and Deputy Secretary Mayorkas quietly engaged in the beginnings of 
a series of negotiations that would ultimately repeal wet foot/dry foot.94 
On January 12, 2017, President Obama announced the immediate termination of 
the special status afforded Cubans migrants who stepped foot on U.S. soil.95 The Joint 
Statement Communique between the United States and Cuba Concerning Normalizing 
Migration Procedures: 
…[outlined] certain measures which were agreed in order to promote 
migration between the two countries that is safe, legal and orderly. Actions 
agreed in the Joint Statement [included] the return of Cubans attempting to 
migrate illegally to the United States, the end of the wet foot/dry foot policy 
and the parole program for Cuban health care professionals, and application 
to Cuban nationals of the same migration procedures and standards that are 
applicable to nationals of other countries.96 
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In an instant, the pull factor contributing to illegal migration from Cuba evaporated. 
The Coast Guard went from interdicting more than 5,000 Cuban migrants in fiscal year 
2016 to just over 2,000 in fiscal year (FY)17, the majority of which were interdicted 
between October 1, 2016, and January 11, 2017 (before the policy’s end). FY18 
interdictions totaled a mere 200 by August 14. Dramatic declines also occurred at and 
between ports of entry along the southwest border (58,269 in FY16; 20,955 in FY17; 6,044 
in FY18 (as of August 21)).97 For the first time in more than 20 years, the maritime flow 
of migrants (Cuban, Haitian, and Dominican combined) was such that Coast Guard and 
other U.S. law enforcement resources could be balanced against other security priorities. 
D. EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES (HUMAN SMUGGLING 
INVESTIGATIONS) 
As Geoff Thale points out in his comprehensive summary of U.S.-Cuba security 
cooperation, additional areas for expanded collaboration between the Coast Guard and 
Cuban Border Guard may become available. For instance, investigative cooperation may 
disrupt the transnational criminal organizations that continue to threaten safe and orderly 
migration with human smuggling operations by go-fast boats across the Florida Straits and 
Yucatan Passage.98 
Recent investigative cooperation between the Coast Guard Investigative Service 
(CGIS) and Cuban authorities into a transnational human smuggling organization and the 
death of an estimated 13 Cuban migrants in the Eastern Caribbean is an excellent example 
of this form of enhanced security cooperation. On July 9, 2016, go-fast vessel BLUE 
SPIRIT capsized while smuggling an estimated 15 Cuban nationals from St. Maarten to the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. Two days later, a Good Samaritan found the only survivors clinging 
to the capsized vessel hull (two smugglers and two Cuban nationals). During the December 
2016 Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard semi-annual technical exchange, CGIS agents 
briefed Cuban authorities on the human smuggling investigation, sparking an 18-month 
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collaborative effort that culminated in CGIS receiving authorization to interview one of the 
two Cuban survivors in Havana (May 2018).99 
E. CONCLUSION 
In response to the still unresolved health incidents affecting U.S. diplomats serving 
in Cuba, the Trump Administration all but closed the Embassy Havana in October 2017.100 
Since then, consular services have been severely limited with immigrant visa processing 
occurring at the U.S. Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana, while Cubans applying for non-
immigrant or tourist visas, or simply in need of a renewal, must schedule through and travel 
to U.S. embassies or consulates in other countries. Consequently, the U.S. agreement under 
the 1994 migration accords to issue 20,000 immigrant visas annually was last honored in 
2016. Furthermore, the last round of semi-annual migration talks took place in Washington, 
DC in July 2018.101 Although illegal migration from Cuba to the United States has 
continued to trend down substantially, the Biden administration should consider the 
restoration of Embassy Havana diplomatic staffing (to September 2017 levels), the 
reestablishment of consular services, and a return to full participation in the semi-annual 
U.S.-Cuba migration talks. These measures will go a long way to releasing some of the 
pressure that has steadily increased within the populace since the downsizing of Embassy 
Havana in October 2017. 
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V. SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH 
SEARCH AND RESCUE 
The previous two chapters examined the Coast Guard’s drug and migrant 
interdiction missions, emphasizing their foundational role in cultivating the Coast Guard-
Cuban Border Guard maritime security relationship. Although the legacy SAR relationship 
is also considered as a foundational building block, collaboration in this mission area was 
limited in scope until the normalization process encouraged expanded, more robust 
cooperation. Consequently, SAR is examined along with the Coast Guard’s marine 
environmental protection (specifically, oil spill preparedness and response) and port 
security missions in the following three chapters. Indeed, the early successes shared 
between these neighboring maritime security services were incremental, developing 
gradually over the time, but as confidence increased and the political thaw unfolded, these 
additional building blocks of security cooperation became possible between the Coast 
Guard and Cuban Border Guard. 
The first section of this chapter considers the beginnings of Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard SAR cooperation during the Carter administration and summarizes today’s 
seamless command center-to-command center voice communications and coordination. 
The second section reviews two successful Coast Guard overflights of Cuban airspace in 
support of SAR efforts in the Caribbean Sea. The third section highlights operational 
improvements in bilateral SAR cooperation brought about by the Obama administration’s 
policy shift with Cuba, attributed, at least in part, to the benefits of established semi-annual 
Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard technical exchanges. The final section showcases the 
expanded scope of bilateral SAR coordination, specifically the establishment of a Mass 
Rescue Operations (MRO) dialogue between the Coast Guard and Cuban SAR authorities. 
A. SEARCH AND RESCUE BUILDS TRUST 
SAR is more than just the Coast Guard’s legacy “bread and butter” mission. Areas 
of mutual interest, such as SAR, are starting points or bridges to building trust in 
challenging or adversarial relationships with foreign countries. In 1978, the Carter 
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administration first encouraged Coast Guard cooperation with the Cuban Border Guard as 
part of confidence building steps aimed at normalizing relations with Cuba. The two sides 
met in Havana that January and discussed improving communications and SAR 
coordination.102 Although Cuba’s military adventures in Angola and Ethiopia sidelined the 
Carter administration’s normalization efforts, this early Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard 
dialogue led to the establishment of a teletype communications channel for SAR 
coordination and the beginnings of security cooperation.103 
Communications via message evolved from teletype to email over the years, but 
established voice communications protocols remained elusive until the spring of 2015. 
Spurred by the December 2014 U.S.-Cuba normalization announcements, the Coast Guard 
and SAR Cuba (Cuba’s whole-of-government construct for aeronautical and maritime SAR 
coordination) finalized bilateral SAR operational procedures with the exchange of 
diplomatic notes. In addition, vessel-to-vessel and command center-to-command center 
communications protocols were established that significantly improved Coast Guard-SAR 
Cuba response coordination. These newly approved procedures eliminated the legacy 
requirement to route SAR-related messages through respective foreign ministries for 
review and approval. In less than six months, Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard 
command centers progressed from limited direct voice communications to routinely 
contacting each other by telephone for SAR coordination.104 
B. CLEARING THE AIRSPACE 
It seems simple enough, but something as benign as obtaining aircraft overflight 
authorization from another country can significantly affect the odds for shipwreck 
survivors. Years of cooperation between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities, coupled 
with the January 2017 U.S.-Cuba SAR agreement, enabled the Seventh Coast Guard 
District (Miami) to obtain aircraft overflight clearance quickly from Cuba’s foreign 
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ministry during a September 2018 response. With 28 Jamaican fishermen forced to 
abandon their burning 130-foot fishing vessel deep in the Caribbean basin, the Coast Guard 
and Colombian Navy were racing against time. As Captain Shawn Koch, chief of incident 
management for the Seventh District, explained, “This [overflight authorization] cut off at 
least two additional hours of flying [the Clearwater based HC-130 Hercules] around the 
western tip of Cuba.”105 Thanks to the prompt cooperation from Cuban authorities, the HC-
130 aircrew was able to locate the fishermen during the initial aircraft sortie, who were 
clinging to debris and the capsized vessel’s hull. After dropping life rafts from the HC-130, 
the Coast Guard coordinated the successful rescue of all 28 survivors with assistance from 
nearby motor tanker CHALLENGE POLLUX. The Colombian Navy then transferred the 
SAR survivors ashore in San Andres, Colombia for medical care.106 The importance of 
quickly obtaining overflight clearance of Cuba to the success of this rescue effort was not 
lost on the HC-130 lead pilot. As Commander Troy Glendye stated, “The fact that we were 
able to do that for this case was monumental.”107 
The first instance of a Coast Guard overflight of Cuban airspace in support of SAR 
occurred September 5, 2014. Larry and Jane Glazer, Rochester real estate developers, 
passed out at the controls of their TBM-900 aircraft while flying at 25,000 feet on their 
way to Naples, Florida. With the plane proceeding southeast on autopilot, the Coast Guard 
coordinated an HC-130 Hercules overflight of Cuba, arriving in the search area shortly 
after the plane disappeared from radar (approximately 14 miles north of Jamaica). While 
no one survived, the Coast Guard’s ability to work directly with Cuban authorities ensured 
the HC-130 was on scene shortly after the crash. North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) scrambled two F-16 fighter jets to follow the plane as it tracked south 
along the Florida Coast; the fighter jets broke off from their escort at the boundary of 
Cuba’s territorial airspace. Even without established diplomatic ties, the relationship 
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between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities served as the benchmark for cooperation 
in areas of mutual interest. Although established protocols existed for coordinating SAR 
cases with Cuba, this case predated the historic announcements by Presidents Obama and 
Castro by a few months. The uncertainty of this first ever SAR overflight of Cuba caused 
some senior Coast Guard officials to question the safety of the HC-130 aircrew. Despite 
the lack of diplomatic relations and no formal SAR agreement, the Coast Guard HC-130 
received timely overflight clearance and transited Cuban airspace without incident.108 
C. INCREASED SEARCH AND RESCUE COORDINATION 
As normalization initiatives expanded in scope, the Coast Guard and Cuban Border 
Guard benefited from consistent semi-annual technical exchanges from January 2015 
through January 2018, including fruitful discussions that enhanced SAR collaboration. On 
January 18, 2017, the bilateral SAR operational procedures (first agreed upon in 2015) got 
an upgrade as representatives from the U.S. and Cuban governments signed the Agreement 
on Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue at the Hotel Nacional in Havana. As the 
Department of State explained, “The purpose of this Agreement is to strengthen 
cooperation in the field of maritime and aeronautical search and rescue in order to enhance 
effectiveness and efficiency in assisting persons in distress and to act in furtherance of 
obligations under international law.”109 Although the Trump administration opted not to 
further normalization efforts, and the various bilateral security dialogues were shelved 
because of safety concerns over the unexplained health incidents that affected U.S. 
diplomats, SAR cooperation continued to prosper from this collaborative foundation. A 
few operational examples the author considers emblematic of this increased SAR 
cooperation are included as follows. 
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1. Man Overboard 
The Coast Guard received excellent support from Cuban authorities during the 
extensive search for a 23-year-old man who fell overboard in the early morning hours of 
March 15, 2017, from cruise ship CARNIVAL VICTORY. The incident occurred 33 miles 
northwest of Pinar del Rio, Cuba, as the cruise ship was transiting the Yucatan Passage on 
its way from Key West to Cozumel. Search assets included Coast Guard cutter CHARLES 
SEXTON, a Miami based HC-144 Ocean Sentry aircraft, and Cuban Border Guard patrol 
vessels, which combined to search nearly 3,500 square miles for more than 16 hours. The 
command center-to-command center coordination, aircraft overflight authorizations, and 
Cuban Border Guard surface asset support all reflect the strong SAR cooperation shared 
between the United States and Cuba.110 
2. Missing Fishermen 
On May 17, 2017, the Cuban Border Guard command center contacted the Seventh 
District command center requesting SAR support for an overdue 22-foot vessel with two 
fishermen on board. The fishing vessel ANA MARTA, which departed Santa Cruz del Norte, 
east of Havana, had failed to return to report as planned. The Coast Guard dispatched an 
HC-144 Ocean Sentry aircraft from Air Station Miami, which marked the first time the 
Seventh District launched a ready aircraft in direct support of a Cuban SAR case. Following 
receipt of a radio distress call almost 24 hours later, a Coast Guard Station Islamorada boat 
crew rescued the fishermen approximately 17 miles south of Grassy Key. The fishermen 
reported being adrift for three days after losing propulsion on May 15, 2017. Due to a 
combination of deteriorating weather, poor condition of the vessel, and an unknown heart 
condition of the older fisherman, Station Islamorada transferred both fishermen ashore as 
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SAR survivors for medical evaluations at Mariners Hospital. The two fishermen ultimately 
made their way back home to Cuba.111 
3. Overloaded Haitian Sail Freighter 
Shortly after midnight on April 7, 2018, Coast Guard cutter RELIANCE located an 
overloaded Haitian migrant vessel in international waters southeast of Moa, Cuba. Cutter 
RELIANCE embarked 50 of the 127 Haitian migrants crammed aboard the unstable 70-
foot sail freighter without incident. The remaining 77 migrants refused to comply as they 
continued on a northwesterly course into Cuban territorial waters. Thanks to close 
coordination between the Seventh District and Cuban Border Guard command centers, 
Cuban authorities safely interdicted the remaining 77 migrants and brought them ashore 
for medical evaluations. Eventually, all 127 migrants were repatriated to Haiti. 
D. EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES (MASS RESCUE OPERATIONS) 
During the December 2016 Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard semi-annual 
technical exchange, Cuban officials requested Coast Guard authorities return to Havana in 
the spring of 2017 for an MRO focused exchange with SAR Cuba. Widely regarded as 
experts of land-based disaster preparedness in advance of approaching hurricanes, Cuban 
authorities recognized that their MRO experience in the maritime domain was limited. To 
their MRO credit, 19 crewmembers were hoisted by helicopter from the container ship 
HANSA BERLIN on August 26, 2012. The 474-foot Liberian flagged vessel suffered an 
engine casualty in heavy seas produced by tropical storm Isaac, and ran aground near 
Mariel, Cuba. With large capacity passenger vessels routinely plying waters in close 
proximity to Cuban shores, and increasing numbers of cruise ships calling on Cuban ports 
(especially after the removal of prohibitions on U.S. cruise ships in May 2016), SAR Cuba 
recognized the importance of expanded SAR cooperation to include MRO dialogue.112 
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SAR Cuba was established by Law No. 278 in 2006 (commission and framework), 
integrating Civil Defense and all aspects of air and maritime coordination. Cuba’s Ministry 
of Transport (MITRANS) is the designated authority for the whole-of-government 
approach to SAR coordination; other ministries and organizations include MINFAR, 
Ministry of Communications, MININT, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Relations 
(MINREX), Public Health (MINSAP), Ministry of Tourism, Civil Defense, and the 
fisheries industry. MINFAR serves as the central coordinator for air and maritime SAR 
and plays a more active role when foreign vessels or aircraft are the subject of the SAR 
response. The aviation coordination center (CCA) and maritime coordination center 
(CCM) are subordinate. Cuba is further divided by region with three aviation response 
centers and nine maritime response centers.113 
The first MRO technical exchange was hosted in Havana in May 2017 and was the 
first U.S.-Cuba security dialogue involving senior decision makers from MINFAR (aside 
from the legacy fence line talks at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo). Coast Guard and 
SAR Cuba authorities shared ideas and best practices in a collective effort to strengthen 
SAR cooperation, specifically in terms of MRO response coordination. The visit also 
marked the first time since 2005 that Coast Guard officials visited Cuba’s maritime 
coordination center at the Cuban Border Guard headquarters in Havana. The author 
considers this unusual access a reciprocal result of Cuban authorities being able to visit the 
Seventh District Command Center during the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard technical 
exchange in June 2016 (the first time the technical exchange series was held in Miami). 
Both delegations agreed that the increased passenger vessel traffic between South Florida 
and Cuba warranted closer attention, and they agreed to schedule a series of additional 
MRO exchanges to deepen the SAR relationship.114 
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Representatives from SAR Cuba traveled to Key West in March 2018 to participate 
in an MRO tabletop exercise co-hosted by the Seventh Coast Guard District and Norwegian 
Cruise Lines (Figure 1). The 10-member Cuban delegation included officials from 
MINREX, MININT (Cuban Border Guard), Civil Defense, and the ministries of public 
health and tourism. Plans for a third MRO technical exchange in Havana before the end of 
2018 soured with the combination of Trump administration prohibitions on cruise ship 
travel to Cuba and travel precautions stemming from the unexplained health incidents 
affecting U.S. diplomats.115 
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Coast Guard, Search and Rescue Cuba, and Norwegian 
Representatives in Key West.116 
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Without question, safety of life at sea has long been a shared interest of the Coast 
Guard and Cuban Border Guard. Even during periods of very divisive politics, SAR 
communication and operational coordination has remained strong between these 
neighboring maritime services. On December 2, 2020, the author spoke with Geoff Thale, 
President of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), regarding the Coast 
Guard’s cooperation with Cuba. He first learned about the Coast Guard’s relationship with 
the Cuban Border Guard during a 2007 visit to Havana. Despite the fact that the political 
relationship was not good at all toward the end of the Bush administration, he was struck 
by the friendly working relationship he observed between the Coast Guard liaison and his 
Cuban counterparts. As Thale explained, “[WOLA] took more interest in [Coast Guard-
Cuban Border Guard cooperation] because it seemed like, even at a time when there was a 
lot of tension, here was this practical place where there was collaboration going on.” 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Biden administration would do well to reinvigorate the Coast Guard-Cuban 
Border Guard semi-annual technical exchange series. As one of only a few Western 
Hemisphere countries with a truly integrated, whole-of-government approach to SAR, 
Cuba shares the U.S. goal of reinforcing international SAR standards, both air and 
maritime, with regional neighbors. Similarly, renewed attention should be dedicated to the 
mass rescue operations dialogue begun in 2017, another shared interest that has significant 
implications to maritime safety and security. 
  
54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
55 
VI. SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH 
MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Although relatively new to the U.S.-Cuba security cooperation arena, marine 
environmental protection, or more specifically, oil spill preparedness and response, has 
become another important building block between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities. 
Like SAR in the previous chapter, oil spill response cooperation with Cuba predates the 
Obama era normalization, and not until the reestablishment of diplomatic relations did this 
area of maritime security collaboration really come into its own. 
The chapter begins with a brief summary of Cuba’s initial venture into deep ocean 
oil exploration and the scramble that followed as U.S. oil spill response authorities and 
offshore oil industry safety experts tried to maneuver around the economic embargo, still 
scarred from the catastrophic 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill and worried about how to 
prevent a similar scenario from playing out with Cuba in the Florida Straits. The subsequent 
section examines Coast Guard led efforts to develop oil spill response coordination 
protocols with Cuban authorities, first through a productive multilateral forum, and then a 
constructive bilateral oil spill preparedness and response relationship spurred by U.S.-Cuba 
normalization. The final section highlights the cooperative path forward in this new arena 
of oil spill response and emphasizes the wider applicability of this bilateral coordinating 
instrument to shared environmental threats in the maritime domain. 
A. PREVENTING ANOTHER DEEPWATER HORIZON 
An estimated five billion barrels of untapped oil reserve exists under the ocean floor 
off Cuba’s northwest coast, and for more than a decade, Cuban authorities have been 
conducting offshore oil exploration through partnerships with Spain, Russia, Malaysia, and 
Venezuela, to name a few. 117 As Booth further explains, Cuba got the attention of U.S. 
regulatory and environmental response agencies in February 2012, when it began drilling 
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offshore exploratory wells in partnership with Repsol, a Madrid headquartered deep ocean 
drilling company. With the massive Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of 
Mexico not even two years old, U.S. authorities worried about the environmental and 
economic consequences should a similar blowout occur in Cuban waters, approximately 
60 miles south of the Florida Keys.118 
To make matters worse, the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba complicated 
cooperation, forbidding U.S. oil industry and spill response experts from partnering with 
Cuba, and limiting direct U.S.-Cuba government cooperation. In fact, only limited 
environmental cooperation existed between U.S. non-governmental organizations, 
academic institutions, and Cuba’s scientific community prior to Deepwater Horizon. The 
very first dialogue that addressed the environmental concerns associated with Cuba’s 
expanding oil and gas sector was nurtured by the Environmental Defense Fund.119 To avoid 
stiff penalties associated with the embargo, Repsol’s sophisticated Scarabeo 9 semi-
submersible drilling rig was constructed with less than 10 percent of U.S. manufactured 
components, including the critically important blowout preventer. In the event of a 
blowout, the closest capping stack—not U.S. manufactured—was in Scotland, at least one 
week from delivery to the offshore site. Moreover, disposal of oil collected from such a 
spill would also be hampered by the embargo.120 
B. POLICY MILESTONES AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES 
As Guzzo describes, to open an official government-to-government path to 
dialogue with Cuban authorities and technical experts, Coast Guard environmental 
response authorities and contingency planners proposed a multilateral engagement 
framework comprised of government and oil industry experts from Mexico, Jamaica, Cuba, 
the Bahamas, and the United States. With backing from the International Maritime 
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Organization (IMO), this multilateral oil spill response forum first met in 2011. After three 
years of productive meetings, the participating countries finalized the Wider Caribbean 
Region Multilateral Technical Operating Procedures for Offshore Oil Pollution Response 
(MTOP), a series of mutually agreed upon oil spill response coordination protocols. The 
procedures also streamlined the process for vessels and equipment to move across borders 
to assist in the affected country’s territorial waters.121 As Mary Landry, the Coast Guard’s 
Director of Incident Management and Preparedness Policy described in her written 
Congressional testimony, MTOP encouraged the development of a coordinating network 
capable of working across multiple countries to manage a large-scale spill in the Caribbean 
region effectively.122 
During the first week of December 2014, just two weeks before Presidents Obama 
and Castro announced the historic shift in U.S.-Cuba policy, MTOP representatives 
gathered in San Antonio, Texas on the margins of the annual industry led Clean Gulf 
conference. As Josefina Vidal, Director General, U.S. Directorate, MINREX, explained 
during the initial U.S.-Cuba bilateral talks on January 22, 2015, Cuba recognized the 
importance of continued collaboration in the Coast Guard-led working group. Oil spill 
response was (and still is) a critical topic for all MTOP stakeholders because of the 
potential for catastrophe across the entire Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico region.123 
As the United States and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations in July 2015, oil 
spill response continued to track as a focus area of mutual security interest. That October, 
approximately 120 key industry and government leaders met in Havana for the Safe Seas—
Clean Seas symposium, a two-day conference developed by Hunt Petty LLC and hosted 
by Unión Cuba Petróleo (CUPET). Highlights included the latest policy developments 
enabling Cuba to trade with U.S. companies in targeted equipment and service areas, 
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specifically U.S. oil exploration products designed to ensure safe drilling practices and 
effective emergency response to oil spills.124 During the conference, the Coast Guard 
delegation met with MINREX officials to coordinate a bilateral meeting in conjunction 
with the 2015 Clean Gulf conference, hosted in New Orleans that November. MINREX 
officials expressed the Cuban government’s desire to further a possible bilateral oil spill 
response agreement with the United States. Although amenable to meeting under the 
multilateral MTOP construct, both delegations envisioned a future bilateral agreement 
(with diplomatic relations now reestablished) designed to expedite coordination for 
offshore oil spill response, similar to agreements the United States has with Mexico, 
Canada, and Russia. The MEXUS Plan, as the bilateral U.S.-Mexico agreement is known, 
stemmed from the 1979 blowout of a Mexican oil rig that affected the Texas coastline.125 
Ironically, the Coast Guard found itself once again on the leading edge of U.S.-
Cuba security cooperation and pressed forward with a bilateral oil spill response dialogue 
less than 24 hours after Donald Trump’s surprising 2016 election victory. While the Cuban 
population pondered what this unexpected result might portend for continued U.S.-Cuba 
normalization, Coast Guard and State Department officials met in Havana with Cuban 
delegates from MITRANS, Ministry of the Interior, Civil Defense (Disaster Risk 
Reduction), and MINREX to negotiate the final text of a bilateral oil spill response 
agreement. Not two months later on January 9, 2017, Ambassador Jeffrey DeLaurentis, 
Chargé d’Affaires Embassy Havana, and Vice Minister Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila, 
MITRANS, signed the U.S.-Cuba oil spill preparedness and response agreement on behalf 
of their respective governments. Accordingly, the United States and Cuba agreed to work 
together to prevent and respond to potential oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and Florida 
Straits.126 
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The oil spill response agreement identified the Ministry of Transport and Civil 
Defense as Cuba’s designated authorities, with the Coast Guard leading U.S. coordination 
efforts. As part of the agreement, both countries agreed to develop a coordination plan, the 
initial draft of which was negotiated in Fort Lauderdale in March 2018. In addition to the 
designated authorities, Cuba’s delegation included representatives from the Ministries of 
Science, Technology, and the Environment (CITMA); Energy and Mines, Interior (Cuban 
Border Guard), and MINREX. The U.S. delegation was comprised of Coast Guard and 
State Department subject matter experts. The bilateral coordination plan, simply referred 
to as the CUBUS Plan, was signed by the Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for 
Operations in December 2019, following a thorough review by the National Security 
Council and State Department. In March 2020, the Minister of Transportation and Chief of 
Civil Defense signed on behalf of the Cuban government.127 
C. NOT JUST DEEP OCEAN OIL RIGS 
COVID-19 has prevented further engagement in this important area of maritime 
cooperation, but Coast Guard and Cuban authorities are optimistic the first meeting under 
the CUBUS Plan will take place in summer 2021. In addition to establishing coordination 
protocols and oil spill response procedures, the CUBUS Plan encourages the exchange of 
operational and scientific information and outlines a framework for joint contingency 
planning and a series of periodic response exercises.128 
Although deep ocean oil exploration and the potential for a catastrophic platform 
blowout was the driving force behind the bilateral U.S.-Cuba oil spill response agreement 
and subsequent CUBUS Plan, it is important to note the wider applicability of this bilateral 
coordinating instrument to shared environmental threats in the maritime domain. Just 
remember the February 2016 marine casualty involving motor tanker KRITI AMBER, 
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disabled and adrift in the Florida Straits 13 miles south of Sombrero Key, Florida. For 
approximately 48 hours, Cuban authorities quietly assisted KRITI AMBER with towing 
vessel HURACAN I, dispatched from Matanzas, Cuba. The motor tanker was fully loaded 
with crude oil and drifting uncomfortably close to the fragile reefs of the Florida Keys. On 
February 15, 2016, Cuban authorities contacted Tsavliris Salvage to provide assistance 
with RESOLVE EARL, a larger towing vessel based in Freeport, Bahamas. RESOLVE 
EARL arrived on scene with KRITI AMBER on February 16, 2016 and proceeded to tow 
the disabled motor tanker south to awaiting port tugs just north of Cuban territorial waters 
near Matanzas, Cuba. Although this incident did not result in catastrophic environmental 
consequences, it illustrates the importance of contingency response protocols between U.S. 
and Cuban authorities.129 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Coast Guard’s early efforts to develop oil spill response coordination protocols 
with Cuban authorities through the MTOP multilateral forum are noteworthy and indicative 
of the shared concern for environmental protection. As seen with the previous case studies 
on other building blocks of U.S.-Cuba security cooperation, the oil spill preparedness and 
response relationship needed U.S.-Cuba normalization to truly flourish. The Biden 
administration should encourage continued cooperation in this relatively new but critical 
area of U.S.-Cuba maritime security cooperation, especially now that the oil spill response 
implementation CUBUS Plan is complete. As emphasized with the 2016 incident involving 
motor tanker KRITI AMBER, this bilateral coordinating instrument has wider applicability 
to shared environmental threats in the maritime domain. 
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VII. SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH 
PORT SECURITY 
As seen in each of the previous case study chapters, the Coast Guard’s security 
cooperation relationship with Cuban authorities accelerated considerably with the arrival 
of the Obama administration’s efforts to normalize U.S.-Cuba relations. This case study on 
the port security mission area or building block is of particular interest because it only 
emerged as a possibility after the onset of normalization. 
To resolve policy obstacles impeding the Obama administration’s efforts to 
reestablish commercial maritime links, a port security dialogue between the Coast Guard 
and Cuba’s designated authority was essential. This chapter begins with an overview of the 
origins of the International Ship and Port Security code, the Coast Guard’s post-9/11 port 
security program, and Cuba’s listing on the Port Security Advisory. The next section traces 
the Coast Guard’s efforts to develop a constructive U.S.-Cuba port security relationship 
and assess the adequacy of port security measures in Cuban ports. The chapter concludes 
with a brief explanation of the Secure Trade and Travel Flows technical exchange series, 
an effort by DHS and Cuban security counterparts to expand opportunities for increased 
air and maritime security cooperation during U.S.-Cuba normalization. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A key ingredient of the Obama administration’s U.S.-Cuba normalization effort 
was increasing opportunities for interaction between the U.S. and Cuban populations, 
through government-to-government and people-to-people exchanges. In addition to 
encouraging public and privately funded exchanges across all sectors of civil society, the 
Obama administration recognized the need “to support the development of scheduled and 
chartered air service and maritime links, including ferries.”130 Following a thorough 
review, Cuba was removed from DOS’ state sponsors of terrorism list in May 2015, but 
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additional obstacles remained as Cuba was still listed by the United States as having 
insufficient port security practices. Although more a reflection of the Coast Guard’s 
inability to visit Cuban port facilities, an assessment of Cuba’s port security practices was 
necessary to determine whether Cuba was fulfilling the requirements of the International 
Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code.131 
Developed to protect the international seafaring community against maritime 
terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the ISPS code was adopted by governments 
signatory to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), during a 
December 2002 global conference hosted by the IMO. Less than two years later, the ISPS 
code came into force on July 1, 2004.132 As the recognized U.S. maritime security expert, 
the Coast Guard developed an International Port Security (IPS) program to reduce the risks 
to U.S. maritime interests. Through a combination of cooperative port security partnerships 
and reciprocal visits with coastal trading states, the Coast Guard assesses the 
implementation of the ISPS code, exchanges port security best practices, and strengthens 
U.S. port security and the global maritime transportation system.133 Since Cuba was listed 
on the Coast Guard’s Port Security Advisory (PSA) list, additional security steps, such as 
vessel compliance boardings, were required to clear cargo and passenger vessels arriving 
to the United States from Cuba’s ports (to include the last five ports of call). Consequently, 
most commercial vessels with a U.S. trade nexus steered clear of Cuba, in part, to avoid 
costly port clearance delays when calling on subsequent U.S. ports. 
B. POLICY MILESTONES AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES 
On October 1, 2015, a Coast Guard delegation of international port security 
specialists met with Cuban authorities in Havana for the first of multiple exchanges 
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regarding port security. The author discussed this historic first visit and other aspects of 
the U.S.-Cuba port security relationship during an interview with Jon Mangum on February 
26, 2021. The retired Coast Guard port security official served as head of delegation for 
the groundbreaking port security visits to Cuba (2015–2016). He noted the first step 
actually took place approximately six months before the initial visit to Havana, during a 
diplomatic reception he attended at the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC. On February 
26, 2021, the author interviewed Jon Mangum about the Coast Guard longstanding 
relationship with the Cuban Border Guard. As Mangum explained, once the Cuban 
diplomatic officials learned about his port security role:  
the pecking order…started to increase in power and title as they came over 
to introduce themselves. …[and] by the end of the night, the Chargé 
d’Affaires came over, and we [talked about what the Coast Guard] would 
want to see when we went to Havana. I said we would want to see a 
petroleum facility, a general cargo facility, and a cruise terminal. We would 
want full access while we were there. Inside the fence, inside the control 
rooms. 
Consequently, according to Mangum, when the U.S. diplomatic note arrived at the Cuban 
Embassy a few months later requesting access to the same three types of port facilities, 
Cuba responded with approval rather quickly as the request seemed appropriate to them. 
Although these early indications were favorable, the first port security technical 
exchange proved more challenging than anticipated. Cuban authorities expressed their 
objections to the April 2008 decision by the United States placing Cuba on the PSA list 
and insisted the bilateral port security dialogue be separate from what they viewed as an 
unjust, unilateral decision. As the head of Cuba’s delegation explained, “Cuba had been 
implementing anti-terrorism measures in its ports since the explosion of LA COUBRE in 
Havana on March 4, 1960.”134 The French freighter was unloading Belgian manufactured 
small arms and munitions for the Cuban Army when multiple explosions occurred that 
killed more than 75 people and injured upwards of 200 others. Speculation swirled the day 
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following as Castro accused the United States of sabotage, which U.S. authorities 
repeatedly denied.135 
Indeed, Cuban authorities considered their port security measures to be the example 
after years of experience countering sabotage and incursions. Furthermore, Cuba’s 
implementation of the ISPS code began in July 2004, and they reasoned their port security 
practices were transparent and accessible through international forums, such as the IMO.136 
The reciprocal aspect of the Coast Guard’s port security program, as Mangum stressed, 
“that really was like a pivot for them.” According to the interview with Mangum, combined 
with the understanding that the Coast Guard’s approach was the same regardless of the 
other country involved, both sides agreed to cooperate and advance the port security 
dialogue. 
This collective desire to advance a constructive port security dialogue was 
reinforced only a couple of weeks later when then Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, 
Alejandro Mayorkas, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner, Gil 
Kerlikowske, visited with their Cuban security counterparts in Havana. With dramatic 
increases in air and maritime traffic expected, the high-level visit encouraged broader 
dialogue between U.S. and Cuban law enforcement organizations responsible to secure 
trade and travel through air and sea ports of entry. DHS agreed to expand cooperation with 
Cuba’s MININT and Customs Authority (AGR) to enhance the security of these travel and 
trade flows. This increased cooperation included topics, such as passenger screening, port 
security, and document fraud detection.137 
Coast Guard port security specialists returned to Cuba in February 2016, visiting 
the cruise terminal in Havana, the container facility in Mariel, and the supertanker terminal 
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in Matanzas. According to the interview with Mangum, the visiting Coast Guard 
delegation, also led by Mangum, received unprecedented access to these port facilities, and 
was able to make the observations necessary to move forward with a comprehensive 
assessment of Cuba’s implementation of the ISPS code. The Coast Guard delegation noted 
five Cuban port security best practices and commented that such international visits usually 
result in no more than two or three noteworthy port security measures. Less than two weeks 
later, the Coast Guard’s IPS program hosted the Cuban delegation of port security experts 
for a reciprocal visit to comparable port facilities in Jacksonville, Tampa, and Mobile.138 
On March 17, 2016, the Coast Guard’s IPS program issued Port Security Advisory 
(1-16) and concluded that Cuba was implementing appropriate port security practices in 
accordance with the ISPS code. The actual advisory reads as follows: 
The Coast Guard has determined that the Republic of Cuba is now 
maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures in their ports. The Republic 
of Cuba is removed from the list of the Countries Affected in paragraph B 
of this Port Security Advisory. Therefore, actions required in paragraphs C 
and D of this Port Security Advisory are no longer required for vessels that 
arrive in the United States after visiting ports in the Republic of Cuba.139 
Commercial passenger and cargo vessels traveling to Cuba from the United States 
would still need to obtain licensing approval through the Departments of Treasury and 
Commerce, but the conditions of entry previously imposed by the Coast Guard upon return 
to U.S. ports would no longer be required. Similarly, additional security measures required 
for U.S. vessels calling on Cuban ports were also removed (such as additional security 
requirements while moored in Cuban ports).140 This change opened the door to U.S. cruise 
lines, such as Norwegian and Carnival that began calling on Havana a few months later in 
May 2016.141 
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Despite considerable disagreement at the outset, this series of port security 
exchanges developed quickly, in part because the trust relationship between the Coast 
Guard and Cuban authorities was already well established, but also because it represented 
another area where working together proved beneficial to both sides. DeLaurentis 
reinforced the assertion this way in his interview with the author: 
one would assume something like a port security visit would be viewed in 
Cuba as intrusive and unnecessary, something [Cuban authorities] would 
bristle at. On the other hand, the notion that it was done all over the world, 
was really a function of reciprocity, and two sovereign nations treating each 
other equally, was very important to them. Once those principles were 
established, they had no problem going through the motions. 
Similar to the four previous mission area case studies, this building block of port security 
was not only a shared security concern, but Cuba was willing to cooperate because the 
United States approached the process no differently than as with any other country. 
C. EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES (SECURE TRADE AND TRAVEL) 
As part of the expanded dialogue between DHS and Cuba’s MININT and AGR, a 
comprehensive secure trade and travel working group consisting of various component 
organizations from both countries was envisioned. This Secure Trade and Travel Flows 
working group first convened on September 28, 2016 in Washington, DC. The DHS 
delegation was co-chaired by Alan Bersin, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, 
and Seth Stodder, Assistant Secretary for Border, Immigration, and Trade Policy. Senior 
representatives from DHS components included the Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and the TSA. 
Cuba’s delegation was comprised of senior officials from the Border Guard, Port 
Authority, Immigration, Customs Authority, Civil Aviation Authority, Cybersecurity, and 
MINREX. This expanded security collaboration was a tenet of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) signed between DHS and MININT-AGR in May 2016. As 
explained by senior DHS border and transportation security officials before the House 




The MOU sets the basis of cooperation in exchanging risk information for 
travelers, cargo or conveyances in international transit; the continuation of 
periodic, mutual, and reciprocal assessments regarding air, sea, and port 
security; and the coordination of transportation security, screening of cargo, 
travelers baggage, and the design of secure, efficient inspection facilities at 
ports and airports, among other things.142 
Highlights from the Secure Trade and Travel Flows exchange included Cuba’s 
approval for the Coast Guard’s continued IPS program dialogue and port security visits, 
the cultivation of a CBP-AGR relationship similar to that of the Coast Guard and Cuban 
Border Guard, and the coordination necessary to finalize TSA’s federal air marshal 
initiative aboard U.S. commercial flights operating between Cuba and the United States. 
In addition, the Cuban Border Guard reiterated its concern about the increasing risk 
associated with growing recreational vessel flows and the importance of continued SAR 
coordination and improved law enforcement information sharing. AGR proposed a future 
reciprocal CBP visit to Havana and expressed appreciation for the canine security exchange 
proposed by TSA.143 As Bersin explained in the interview, “I was pleasantly surprised by 
the extent to which we were able to have genuine dialogue… I was struck by the 
constructive nature of the discussion, and the need to find out through negotiation just how 
far they were willing to go.” 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although travel precautions stemming from the unexplained health incidents 
affecting U.S. diplomats and the Trump administration’s rollback of normalization slowed 
security engagements considerably, the Secure Trade and Travel Flows working group met 
again in 2017. The port security dialogue has continued unabated, with additional technical 
exchanges between Coast Guard and Cuban port security experts and visits to the eastern 
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port of Santiago de Cuba and southern port of Cienfuegos.144 As the Biden administration 
reviews U.S.-Cuba policy, expanded law enforcement and security cooperation will 
undoubtedly be a focus area. Regardless of whether maritime travel and trade builds back 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
As the only branch of the military with law enforcement statutory authority, the 
Coast Guard’s unique authorities across the maritime security spectrum open doors to 
international engagement and security cooperation in complex political environments. 
Surprisingly, the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border Guard 
serves as an excellent example of this distinctive capability and its importance to U.S. 
national security. The examination of this positive and productive security relationship—
before, during, and after normalization—through the lens of five Coast Guard mission-
specific case studies, provides a number of important findings and recommendations. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
The operational focus of the Coast Guard’s maritime security cooperation with the 
Cuban Border Guard, combined with measured growth in building block mission areas of 
mutual concern, are key factors in the long-term success of this important relationship. The 
Coast Guard’s investment in the permanent in-person liaison position at U.S. Embassy 
Havana is another key factor, signaling commitment to a cooperative relationship built on 
trust and mutual respect. The decision not to remove the Coast Guard liaison as part of  
the 2017 reduction in diplomatic staffing is indicative of the position’s importance to the 
Coast Guard. 
The Coast Guard’s expanded cooperation with Cuban authorities across multiple 
mission areas during normalization is also noteworthy. This well-established relationship 
served as the catalyst for broader U.S.-Cuba law enforcement cooperation. The United 
States and Cuba negotiated and signed multiple security arrangements, developed new 
frameworks for the exchange of information (especially in the areas of SAR and oil spill 
preparedness and response), and expanded security dialogues across the law enforcement 
spectrum (port security and secure trade and travel in particular). 
Implications of the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship as a model for 
use with other complicated international relationships are also a key consideration. 
Regardless of the law enforcement agency involved, the Coast Guard has demonstrated 
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that incremental steps can be taken to build relationships in areas of mutual concern, despite 
the ups and downs associated with strained relationships at the political level. 
Finally, the broader importance of the Obama administration’s dramatic U.S.-Cuba 
policy shift and efforts to normalize relations is emphasized. By considering the 
geopolitical significance of Cuba, especially in terms of the implications for U.S. foreign 
policy objectives with the wider Caribbean and Latin America, it is possible to understand 
why this new approach was in the U.S. national interest. The United States should take 
additional steps to encourage Cuba’s integration in the multilateral regional security 
framework. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
By reviewing the aftereffects of the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S.-Cuba 
policy, specifically the impacts on the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard security 
relationship, it can be determined that such a policy reversal does not serve the national 
security interests of the United States. With no significant concentration of bilateral 
security exchanges since early 2018, the United States should take steps to reinvigorate 
important dialogues on counternarcotics, illegal migration, counterterrorism, and mass 
rescue operations, among others. Instead of using the still unexplained health incidents as 
an excuse to marginalize U.S.-Cuba relations, the United States should collaborate with 
Cuba’s scientific and medical experts in the continued search for an explanation. 
Law enforcement and counterdrug cooperation have always been areas of mutual 
interest for the U.S. and Cuba. Despite Trump’s traditional hardline approach, none of the 
22 bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding were vacated. Renewed 
cooperation and information sharing by the Biden administration would likely lead to 
increased drug disruptions and interdictions, as well as deter further expansion of drug 
trafficking networks. 
Although illegal migration from Cuba to the United States has continued to trend 
down substantially since the 2017 repeal of wet foot/dry foot, increased sanctions, 
combined with the challenges of currency reunification, COVID-19, and the lack of 
accessible consular services, have pressurized the possibility of another wave. The Biden 
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administration should consider the restoration of Embassy Havana diplomatic staffing (to 
September 2017 levels), the reestablishment of consular services, and a return to the 
commitments outlined in the migration accords. 
SAR is a mainstay in the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship, but the 
last semi-annual technical exchange between them occurred in January 2018. The Biden 
administration would do well to reinvigorate this periodic reciprocal exchange series, as 
well as the mass rescue operations specific dialogue begun in 2017. The maritime safety 
and security implications associated with these areas of mutual concern are too significant 
to ignore. 
As seen with the other building blocks of U.S.-Cuba security cooperation, the oil 
spill preparedness and response relationship benefited from the normalization of relations. 
In addition to establishing coordination protocols and oil spill response procedures, the 
CUBUS Plan encourages the exchange of operational and scientific information and 
outlines a framework for joint contingency planning and a series of periodic response 
exercises. The United States should encourage continued cooperation in this relatively new 
but critical area of U.S.-Cuba maritime security, especially now that the CUBUS Plan  
is complete. 
Unlike the other case study mission areas where security cooperation stalled 
considerably under Trump, the port security engagements between Coast Guard and Cuban 
authorities have continued without interruption. Regardless of whether maritime travel and 
trade builds back to normalization era levels under President Biden, port security 
cooperation will continue to play an important role moving forward. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further examination in other areas of U.S.-Cuba security cooperation, as well as 
Coast Guard relationships with other countries, may reveal supportive or even alternative 
findings about the importance of measured development in areas of security mutual 
concern. In terms of Cuba, two other security cooperation relationships come to mind. The 
TSA shares an important long-term security relationship with its Cuban counterpart, 
Cuba’s Civil Aviation Authority. Exploring DOD efforts to open new channels of defense 
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cooperation with Cuba’s Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR), beyond the monthly 
Guantanamo fence line talks, during the normalization of relations would also provide 
important insights. 
The Coast Guard has established maritime security relationships with other 
countries that have a complicated political history with the United States. The Coast 
Guard’s operational relationship with the Russian Border Guard is another great example 
of security cooperation in mission specific areas of mutual concern. 
D. FINAL THOUGHT 
Trust relationships develop incrementally over time, and their strength depends on 
a foundation of mutual respect. The Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard maritime security 
relationship embodies this premise. 
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